Manned systems utilization analysis (study 2.1).  Volume 2:  Manned systems utilization by Mayfield, E. B.
General Disclaimer 
One or more of the Following Statements may affect this Document 
 
 This document has been reproduced from the best copy furnished by the 
organizational source. It is being released in the interest of making available as 
much information as possible. 
 
 This document may contain data, which exceeds the sheet parameters. It was 
furnished in this condition by the organizational source and is the best copy 
available. 
 
 This document may contain tone-on-tone or color graphs, charts and/or pictures, 
which have been reproduced in black and white. 
 
 This document is paginated as submitted by the original source. 
 
 Portions of this document are not fully legible due to the historical nature of some 
of the material. However, it is the best reproduction available from the original 
submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced by the NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19760006054 2020-03-22T17:30:54+00:00Z
^	 r
=Z v>
'17 ^ ®J Z J9J,
go	 r 7
CSC	 Ir	 j
.
	 1 September 1975
AEROSPACE REPORT NO.
ATR-76(7361 )-1, VOL II
Manned Systems Utilization Analysis ( Study 2.1 )
Final Report
Volume II: Manned Systems Utilization
(NASA-CF-1455 , )	 MIMI: SYSTEMS " 111.ATIch
	 N76-13142
ANALYSIS (STUDY 2.1). VCLUME 2: MAME
SYSTIMS IITILIZATICN Final FeFort (AerosFacE
Corp., E1 Segundo, Calif.)
	 134 F HC $6.CU
	 Unclas
CECI 22A G3`13 15044
Prepared by
ADVANCED MISSION ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE
ADVANCED ORBITAL SYSTEMS DIVISION
Prcparcd for OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D. C.
Contract No. NASW -'L727
I 
A^
Systems Engineering Operations
THL A f. KOSPACE CORPORATIOie
x
i	 a
tt
fE Report No. x
r
ATR-76(7361)-i, Vol II
f	 r,
E
MANNED SYSTEMS UTILIZATION ANALYSIS (STUDY 2. 1)
:FINAL REPORT 9
Volume II: Manned Systems Utilization
i
Prepared by -
•
i
i
Dr. E. B. Maorkld, Head R. R. Wolfe
Solar Physics Department NASA Study Z. i Director
Space Physics Laboratory Advanced Mission Analysis
.' Directorate
Advanced Orbital Systems Division j
3
Approved by
. H. Herndon, Group Director
Advanced Mission Analysis
Directorate
Advanced Orbital Systems Division
,
f
Study 2. 1, Manned Systems Utilization Analysis, is a continuation
of previous efforts directed at investigating new operational concepts for
future space applications. This effort addresses the potential improvement
in operational effectiveness that could be achieved by active manned mainte-
nance of scientific instruments. Skylab/ATM (Apollo Telescope Mount)
experience is employed as an historical foundation for what can be accom-
plished even when the instruments have not been designed for maintenance.
Empirical relationships are developed to relate man's contribution to the
success of the mission. This effort, coupled with associated contractor
studies under NASA direction, point up the utility of man in space and em-
phasize the need to incorporate man's role into future space planning efforts.
This study was one of several tasks performed by The Aerospace
Corporation under NASA Contract NASW-2727. This was a 12-month effort,
initiated on 1 September 1974. The Technical Monitor was Mr. V. N. Huff,
Code MT, at NASA Headquarters. Upon Mr. Huff's retirement in May 1975,
the technical responsibility for this effort was assigned to Dr. J. W. Steincamp,
MSFC, Code PD34. This volume is one of five that comprise the Final Report
for Study 2. 1. The five volumes are;
Volume I:	 Executive Summary, ATR-76(7361)-1, Vo,l I
Volume II:	 Manned Systems Utilization, ATR-76(73$1)-1, Vol II
Volume III:	 LOVES Computer Simulations, Results_, and Analyses,
ATR-76(7361)-1, Vol III
Volume IV:	 Program Manu41 and Users Guide for the LOVES
Computer Code, ATR-76(7361)-1 Vol IV (formerly
ATR-74(7341)- 6)
Volume V:	 Program Listing for the LOVES Computer Code,
ATR-76(736i)-1, Vol V (formerly ATR-74(7341)-7)
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Aerospace Corporation, under contract to NASA Headquarters,
Office of Manned Space Flight, has continued to address new concepts that
might enhance future space operations. The basic intent, in all cases, has
been to examine various options that could reduce future expenditures without
sacrificing scientific objectives. This drive toward improved efficiency of
operatA.^,ns has continued to be the major motivation for assessing new system
i
concepts and, in part, serves to emphasize the benefits of these new systems
relative to the integrated space program planning efforts:
l
The Space Transportation System (STS) has substantially expanded
these horizons of space operations and has exposed new fields of interest that
heretofore have not been available for consideration. The capability to effi-
ciently service and maintain 'automated 'payloads in orbit was thoroughly i
Yexamined in the p revious year ' s effort. The cost benefits over the eleven
year period of 1980 through 1990 have been conservatively estimated tc be
over $300 million for geostationary operations alone. This concept, remov-
ing and replacing failed components, with the ability to also upgrade equip-
ments-in orbit, has a tremendous potential for enhancing future operations
and should be exploited to the fullest extent.
Further consideration has led to the possibility of more comprehen-
sive space maintenance operations employing man as the key ingredient to
assure success of a mission. This is of particular interest in low-earth
orbit where highly complex and costly scientific instruments are undercon-
sideratiun in current mission model projections. This class of payloads, in
i
particular, stimulates interest because each tends to be unique in its applica-
tion; therefore, there is no assured maturing process as with operational
satellites. Yet, because of this uniqueness, it is imperative that a high level
3
of availability be maintained along with thr, option to respond to transient
phenomena as it occurs within the framework of steady state operations.
3	 ^	 ,Without question, under the above conditions, the only way to achieve
r	 these goals is through active mannedparticipation. This was repeatedly
f
u
demonstrated, very dramatically, in the recent Skylab Program. As will be
shown later in this report, without this active support and the ability to impro-
vise, there is no doubt that many, if not all, of the ATM experiments would
have fallen far short of their respective scientific objectives. However, this
does not imply poor design, inadequate testing, or improper training, but
merely reflects the very nature of extending the frontiers of scientific
achievement.
Hindsight indicates that many of the anomalies could easily have been
avoided with proper attention in the design and testing phases of the program.
However, although the learning process suffers occasional setbacks, scien-
tific and engineering disciplines do in fact make extensive use of this know-
ledge. But failures and anomalies will be ever present in these types of
applications in particular, because of increasing complexity and the drive to
attack new and unique regions of scientific advance. Under these circum-
stances, it is not possible with classical techniques to predict all failure
paths. Even if it were, it is not feasible to design sufficient levels, of redun-
dancy or alternate paths to all elements of a given design to assure success
• of the operation.
Manned maintenance, with proper spares provisioning and a few
basic tools, can provide that unique element which assures a high level of
success for scientific missions. Arguments in the past in support of this
position have been primarily subjective in nature with little experience fora 	 I
foundation. The Skylab Program has changed this, and now thoughts are
directed at the preferred level of interaction and methods to quantify these	 1
benefits relative to future 'space program options. This is the foundation for
Study 2. 1, Manned Systems Utilization Analysis.
k,
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2. STUDY OBJECTIVES
tt	
_	
^3
It, is a difficult task to quantify man's contribution to mission success
but unless this can be done, it will not be possible to establish a consistent
basis for evaluating man's role for the future. Other study efforts are
addressing man's contribution to simplify payload designs by performing final
assembly and erection of appendages after delivery to orbit. Still, others
	 1
are investigating man's contribution toward assembly of large space struc-
	 1
tures, and what the total manned operational concept should encompass. All
of these efforts join in attacking the question of man's contribution to future
space operations. The total composite emphasizes the need for manned oper -
ations in every facet of the space program. This study emphasizes man's
potential in the areas of maintenance and management of complex and unique
f
scientific instruments.
f
The principal objective of this study is to develop basic data that
4	 demonstrates man's contribution to the achievement of scientific mission
-F
	
	 objectives. Emphasis has been placed on scientific missions, as opposed to
routine operation of subsystem equipments, because of their unique character
and relatively high potential for increased achievement. Historically speak-
ing, one of man's principal roles has been the advancement and application
of scientific achievement. This should also be true of his role in space,
hence the need to quantify these benefits and to examine the basic character
of the operations required to sustain these equipments. The Skylab ATM
j.,
	
	
program is to serve as the foundation for this effort, hence the emphasis is
on experience.
The second objective is to examine, in a theoretical sense, what
could be expected in future applications of scientific instruments relative to
the need for interactive manned support operations. This objective is to
address the design impact, the inherent reliability characteristics, and the 	 +.
relative improvement in system availability that could be achieved by
maintenance or repair actions. Tradeoffs are then to be made to assess the 	 N
di x
viability of manned support versus alternative measures for achieving a high
level of mission success.
3. STUDY APPROACH
I	 I
The tasks performed in this study effort have been directed along
two parallel complementary paths. The first path researches the experience
E'. gof various correlatable space 	 rorams and develops empirical techniques toP	 p rams	 P•	 P	 g	
I
` associate the benefits of repair and management actions.
	 The actions taken
during the course of these, programs are then examined in detail to establish
man's contribution, either remotely or by active participation, to the task of
achieving the original mission objectives.
	 The results are then related to
the possible further enhancement that could have been achieved had the instru-
`i
ment been designed for space maintenance.
J. The second path addresses the penalties in weight and volume asso-
ciated with designing for space maintenance.
	 This is achieved by recr.,nfig--
uring a single instrument and then extrapolating the results to others.
	 The
estimated reliability characteristics are then examined to establish, in a
theoretical sense, how space maintenance could enhance system availability.
Conclusions are then drawn relative to experience versus estimated
repair actions to establish guidelines for future design efforts.
	 The basic
character of anomalies and failures are further considered relative to the
ability to preclude their occurrence as future instruments becorr'ie more com-
plex and costly.
The S-056 X-ray Telescope, flown in the ATM on Skylab (Ref. 1)
was selected as the basic instrument of interest.
	 There is considerable
experience at The Aerospace Corporation relative to solar' physics,, and one
of the principal scientists associated with this program is currently employed
in the Laboratory Division.
	 In addition, Dr. E. Gibson, Scientist - Astronaut
on Skylab IV, is also employed in the same division.
In addition, two earlier experiments were selected to develop a pic-
ture of the growth in instrument complexity.	 These were the OV1 USAF Sat-
- ellite Program (Ref. 2) and the OSO-7 (Ref. 3), -a Goddard Space Flight
( - Center orbiting solar 'observatory.	 Each instrument was designed to record
^i
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data in the X-ray region of the spectrum. Therefore, their results are
correlatable in scientific value and as such provide a reasonable basis of
P	 comparison of automated versus man supported operations. The basic
characteristics of each instrument are shown in Figure 3-1.
The S-056 X-ray Telescope experiment was developed to obtain and
I record data in the X-ray region of the spectrum. The experiment is designed
to provide both X-ray filtergrams in five band widths from 5 to 33 angstroms
and spectral data in two adjacent channels of 10 wavelength bands from 2. 5 to
20 angstroms. The S-056 was launched on 14 May 1973.
The OSO-7 consists of four spectroheliographs and an X-ray polar
.imeter. It was designed to study solar radiation at selected wavelengths in
the X-ray, and in extreme ultraviolet (EUV) ranges r- ake observations at the
H-alpha wavelength, and measure the degree of polarization of X'-ray emis-
sions. Only the grazing incidence telescope (X-ray and EUV spectroheliograph)
was of interest because of its relationship to the S-056 ATM instrument. The
OSO-7 was launched in 1971 and had r::n expected lifetime of 12 months,
The OV1 USAF satellite instrument was a relatively simple instru-
ment designed to collect and record X-ray emissions. It was initially
launched in 1966 (OV1 -10) followed by a second flight in 1969 (OVl-17). It
was designed for an operational lifetime of six months. 	 i
After developing the basic set of data, it was possible to expand the
data search to include many of the remaining ATM experiments. The objec-
tive of this effort was the distribution or spread of the empirical data relative
to that of the S-056 instrument." Although there is some variety in their 	 -
scientif;.c objectives, all of the 'ATM experiments were directed at solar
physics and basically covered different spectral regions.
Empirical relationships were developed to express the complexity of
the design concept relative; to the effectiveness with which the equipment was
maintained in operation. In this regard, remote response to an anomalous
occurrence is also considered maintenance, as experienced on OSO-7. Rela-
tionships were also developed to express the benefits of improved manage-
ment of the instruments resulting from manned interaction as opposed to
pre-programmed activities.
p
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w OSO-7 5-056OVl•10, -17
Instrument Crystal spectrometer,
type: proportional counter
Area of sun Full	 disk
covered:
Resolution: None (emission from whole sun)
Data format: Spectral	 scans, total	 flux
Physical: 12 x 12 x	 14 inch,	 18 Ibs
Mount: 131-axial sun centered pointer,
20 arc-sec stability
Instrument Grcting spectrometer, propor-
type: tional counter, Ha, polarimeter
Area of Full disk in raster 	 scan
sun
covered:
Resolution: 10 x 20 arc-sec
Data Spectral scans, total flux, Ha
format: polarization
Physical: 7 x	 14 x 50 inch,	 50 Ibs
Mount: Bi-axial raster, sun-centered
pointer,	 1	 arc-sec	 stability
Instrument Filtergraph, proFortional
type: counter
Area of sun Full	 disk
covered:
Resolution: 2 arc-sec in picrures,
none for cowiter
Data format: PhoTographs,
	 otol flux
Physical: 23 x 24 x 105 inch,
354 Ibs
Figure 3-1. Basic Experiment Characteristics
.W
fThe above effort involved a substantial amount of research into the
basic instruments, how they were operated, and in detail what results were
obtained. In addition, it also involved lengthy conferences with experts in
the field of solar physics to establish basic relationships that would corre-
late the various experiments to a finite set of common variables. This
included conferences outside of The Aerospace Corporation as well. The
results of this effort are reported in Sections 5 and 6.
During this same period, a detailed study of the 5-056 was performed'
relative to modifying the basic design to allow maintenance of all components
that could represent a potential risk to mission operations. A search was
performed to establis 7.i _reliability characteristics and hence develop an over-
all system reliability for the 5-056. Similar data was also developed for the
OSO-7. It was not possible to develop an accurate reliability estimate, nor
was this the.major intent. It was, however, possible with the available data
to estimate the overall reliability using engineering judgment. This data was
then correlated with the design effort to assure accessibility to the weak
elements.
As a result of this effort, it was then possible to investigate the
remaining ATM experiments of interest and develop approximate weight pen-
alties to allow access for servicing. These weight increments are then used
in subsequent tradeoff's. The results of this effort are reported in Section 4
in order to provide a foundation of design information prior to discussing the
Skylab experience presented ir. Sections 5 and 6. The tradeoffs are reported
in Section 7.
3-4	
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4. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
4.1	 OBJECTIVES
The 5-056 X-ray telescope experiment was selected for an in depth
assessment of the design ;impact associated with orbital maintenance.
	 This
was one of eight experiments incorporated into the Apollo Telescope Mount
(ATM) attached to the Skylab.	 The 5-056 experiment, shown schematically
in Figure 4-1, incorporated two separate and independently operated instru-
ments: the grazing incidence X-ray Telescope (X-RT) and the X-ray event
analyzer (X-REA). 	 The telescope provided x-ray filtergrams in five wave-
length bands '(5 to 33 A) and one in the visible region (6378' A).	 The x-ray
-event analyzer provided for spectral data in 10 wavelength bands (2. 5 to 20 A).
The objective of this portion of Study 2. 1 was to examine the 5-056
experiment packaging concept and reliability characteristics as a basis for
reconfiguring the instrument for orbital maintenance. 	 Specific ground rules
were established for this effort consistent with rational engineering judgment.
In this way, it was possible to establish the approximate impact, in terms of
weight and volume, of designing for orbital maintenance.
	
This impact is then
used to assess the overallbenefits of maintenance versus automated servicing j
or the incorporation of various levels of redundancy. 	 In addition, it is of
special interest to compare the predicted failure characteristics with those
actually experienced in practice.
	
This is a continual problem in any prelim-
inary design; and it is seldom possible to perform a post-operative analysis
to determine' the adequacy of the initial design effort.
The 5-056 is considered to be reasonably representative of the type
of instruments employed for scientific! observations. Alignments are critical °-
and thermal balance is essential.	 The instrument relies on the ATM for
power, attitude st?bilization, pointing, and to some extent thermal -protecition.'-
In the current design, access is limited to removal and replacement of film
cassettes, and to the ATM solar shield door mechanism. 	 Everything else is
located within the ATM canister and, in its current configuration (Ref. 4),, is
4' 1
NSOLAR
SHIELD
.M
6AZINE
f1E R
R WHEEL
SSEMBLY
FOCAL PLANE
Figure 4-1. S056 X-Ray Telescope Configuration
I	 II
inaccessible. The weight budget was established at 161 kg (354 lbs); however,
the actual weight was estimated to be 133 kg (294 lbs).
4.2	 DESIGN DESCRIPTION
The X-ray Telescope consists of two major assemblies: the tele-
scope and camera assembly, and the camera/thermal control electronics
assembly. The grazing-incidence mirrors, supporting tubes, centermount,
and thermal control components are all parts of the telescope. The grazing-
incidence optics provided, an image of the sun to one of the six different filters
of the film camera. Image quality of this type of focusing device is excellent
on the optical axis, but is degraded with angular deviations from this axis.
The optical alignment of the 'telescope was maintained to within fl arc-minute
by the fine sun sensor (f the ATM.
The film camera was designed to place the film plane coincident with
the focal point and to alternately position six different filters ahead of the film
plane. The camera mechanisms, housed within the telescope assembly, are
shown schematically in Figure 4-2 to emphasize the important components.
The film is contained , within a replaceable magazine, retained, at the camera
interface plate by guides. The camera, consisting of the film magazine guide,
the interface plate, the shutter and filter wheels, and associated drive mecha-
nisms recorded the X-ray image on film along with ancillary data describing 	 f
the conditions that existed at the time of exposure. A detail description of
the camera mechanisms is shown in Figure 4-3. Particular attention should
be given to this view because this is where the majority of moving parts are
located. The film magazine is replaced after exposing approximately 6000
,i frames of 35mrn, .SO-212 black and white rollfilm. The drive mechanism
for the film magazine is contained within the camera andprojects through
the faceplate.
The camera/thermal control electronics assembly was contained in
	
'	 a separate housing as previously shown in Figure 4-1. This assembly con-
trols the operation of the electromechanical components within the camera
pand the o eration of the telescope thermal. control system (TCS). It `consists
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Figure 4-2. X-Ray Telescope Functional Schematic
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of exposure sequencers, timers, mode logic circuitry, motor drive amplifiers,
power supplies, and thermal control units. -
€
	
	
There is fundamentally no redundancy in-the electronics except for
the TCS electronics that are paired up with redundant strip heaters, thermo-
stats, and control thermistors. There are, however, manual back up oper-
ating modes (as shown in ,Figure 4-4) that can, to ._a limited extent, approx-
imate the automatic sequencing of exposure operations. This limitation is,
to some extent, dependent upon the mode of failure of the individual logic cir-
cuits. As an example,: the exposure time control inhibits specific timers,
depending upon the mode selected. A typical failure could= prevent removal
of the inhibit signal, thereby precluding the use of the timers in other modes.
In this event, the loss of these exposure timers would be irreversible. How-
ever, if the exposure control merely fails to inhibit the timers, then extra
1
exposures are taken. The additional film use, although substantial, can be
compensated for by the use of additional film cassettes. Consequently, a
workaround path is available. It is not possible to assess all of the potential 1
workaround situations without a detailed study of each logic circuit. There-
fore, for the purpose of estimating the overall reliability these alternate paths i
have been ignored,
The X-ray event analyzer was mounted adjacent to the telescope on
the ATM spar as also depicted previously in Figure 4-1. It consisted of two
gas filled proportional counters with thin metallic windows (one of beryllium
and one of aluminum), aperture size control, pulse-height analyzers, digital-
channel counters,; rate meter and activity history recorder drive circuits,
signal conditioners, and power supplies. The level of X-ray energy passing
through either the aluminum or beryllium filter could be numerically and
graphically displayed to the crew as an aid in selecting thL^ camera modes of
operation. A schematic of the X-ray event analyzer is shown in Figure 4-5
to emphasize its important components.
The camera operated in manual and automated modes, as mentioned
earlier, to obtain various exposure times. The camera electronics automat-
ically sequenced the caxnera through each mode of operation. Each mode of
r
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Figure 4-5. X-Ray Event Analyzer Functional Schematic
A
jaction included shutter open/close, filter movement, and film advance. The
crew could lengthen or shorten the normal exposure time. The 5-056 operated
onlyin the manned mode; that is, a crewman was in attendance to establish
r
and initiate the operational sequences. The crew functions, for reference
purposes, are shown schematically in the figures previously discussed, Fig-
ures 4=2, 4-4, and 4-5, which represent the monitoring and control functions.
As can be seen, in the present configuration, there is little fault isolation
capability. The crew can monitor the filter position, but cannot recognize the
loss of a filter; the crew can select various operating modes, but cannot deter-
mine if the exposure sequences or timers are functioning correctly,.
The following _ground rules were employed in consideration of recon-
figuring the S-056 for on-orbit maintenance: i,
a.	 No attempt was made to improve upon the design or reflect
later technologies. This could tend to mask the effects of
redesigning for servicing.
b._ Maintenance is restricted to removal and replacement of sub-
assemblies, rather than repair of broken items,
	 ?
7
C.	 EVA will be employed to remove complete assemblies, such
as the camera housing, or electronics, only.	 'I
d.	 Disassembly of any subsystem will occur within the pressur-
ized compartment in a shirt sleeve environment.
'	 e.	 Repair procedures will be limited to those subassemblies
that do not require auxiliary equipment for alignment or
calibration.
f.	 All repair actions will be limited to simple movements (nut
removal, pull connectors, etc. ) to avoid the need for solder-
ing, filing, or any other potentially hazardous operation.
4.3	 DESIGN FOR REPAIR
i.:.: :51
Figure 4=6 indicates the areas considered as viable candidates for
repair action. The remaining areas of the telescope assembly consist of
static elements and are not amenable to repair. _ Although a failure may occur
in the main structural body due, for instance, to thermal distortion, no rea-
sonable repair action can be defined. It would therefore be necessary, in this
instance, to abort the mission. Repair of the insulation cover or thermal
standoffs may be possible if deemed necessary._
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The camera housing was redesigned to be removable by a suited 	 i
crewman and returned to the crew compartment interior for repair. It was
.
	
	 elected to retain the housing with the camera to serve as a protective enclo-
sure during transport. The interface between this housing and the telescope
aft tube consists of a V-band flange, so that the housing can be clamped to
the tube rather than bolted. The camera housing and clamp design are shown
in Figure 4 -7. Sufficient accuracy at the machined faces is retained to meet
all alignment requirements. The V-band can be removed by the single move-
ment of an over-center latch. The release handle is held ° in place by a locking
pin which can be removed by the crewman. The V-band will then move forward
to leave the housing unobstructed for removal. The camera faceplate is
bolted to the after interface of the housing. The housing is indexed to assure
proper alignment.
This was a straightforward modification with a negligible weight
impact. However, the application of electrical connectors posed a different
!
	
	 situation. A single connector was desired to replace the existing four con-
nectors. Also, a technique that provides positive alignment of the connectors
during reinstallation was required, considering the limitations of a suited
crewman in EVA. The redesigned connector arrangement is shown in
Figure 4-8 and uses Deutsch rack and panel plugs held together by an external
Acme thread connection. Alignment and guiding of the plugs as they are being
engaged is achieved by the external case surrounding the connectors. The
crewman in pressure suit has simply to rotate the single large ring to mate the
1
connectors. The weight penalty is estimated to be 3. 6 kg (8 lb).
The X-ray event analyzer and the electronic assembly are very simi-
lay in construction. Each consists of specific components that may need replace-
ment during the course of the mission. The proportional counters are particu-
larly susceptible as evidenced by the Skylab experience. Cut-away views of
each assembly are:; 	 in Figures 4-9 and 4-10. Tha electronic components	 i
k (sequencers, power supplies) are mounted on printed circuit boards. As will
be pointed out later, there are numerous single point failures existing in each
of these assemblies. Therefore, it was elected to remove the assembly in toto
ithto t e crew compartment for repair procedures. The vast majority of itemsp	 p	 p	 ^	 y	 ..
can be removed and replaced with ease under these conditions.
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Redesigned Electrical Disconnect 5-056 X-Ray Telescope
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Redesign of the assemblies is shown, typically in Figure 4-11. The
large spin off connector has been incorporated without disturbing the basic
design of the assembly. Hold-down clamps have been altered from 7 screws
to an over center latch system with three latches and a tie bar. The crewman
removes the assembly with a single motion. The weight impact for each
assembly is approximately 2.7 kg (6 lb).
The total estimated, weight 'impact is given in Table 4-1.. This table
summarizes the review made of each element considered as a candidate for i
repair action, outlining the disassembly procedure and associated design
impact.
In summary, the design review indicated that with a, minimum of	 j
redesign the S-056 experiment could be maintained in orbit with little training
and simple tools, The weight impact was approximately 9 kg (20 lbs) for an
original design weight of 133 kg (294 lbs), or seven percent.
The volume requirements were not defined other than to allow .access
to the major subassemblies for removal and replacement. The impact on
overall volume requirements is difficult to assess because this parameter
is very sensitive to the platform configuration, e. g., the ATM. The ATM
canister imposed a severe penalty relative to access to the various instru-
ments. However, had access been a requirement, it should have been
3possible to achieve without a severe _design impact. In addition, the ATM
went through several design evolutions in which operational requirements were
altered. Therefore, it is probably not a good example to employ for assessing
volumetric requirements or the impact of designing for accessibility. 'The
Spacelab platforms may be more representative of future configurations in
which access to all major subassemblies should be readily available.
4.4
	
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
A preliminary reliability assessment was also performed on the
S-056 in support of the above design process. Reliability estimates are in
general difficult to obtain on any system and are particularly so on "one of a
kind" scientific equipment. Wherever possible, documented reliability
analyses were employed. These were then supplemented by engineering i
judgment to arrive at a total system reliability estimate. The majority of
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Weight
ITEM DISASSEMBLY PROCEDURE REQ DESIGN CHANGE Impact
g los
Film Magazine Grasp handle,	 activate latch None 0 0
and withdraw magazine
Shutter/Filter Disconnect Cables and release Redesigned for ease of 0.1 0.2
Mech. Housing "V" band clamp remove/replace action
Interface Plate Remove l cap screws to remove Added bracket and over- 3.6 8.0
from housing size connector
Filter Wheel/ Disconnect electric al leads, Electrical wiring 0 0
Shutter Assembly remove 3 hold down nuts disconnects
Filter Drive Unscrew Fasteners None 0 0
Motor
Shutter Drive Unscrew Fasteners None 0 0
Motor
Airlock Drive Disconnect linkage and unscrew Add disconnects to 0 0
Motor fasteners electrical wiring
Film Drive Disconnect electrical leads and Add disconnects to 0 0
Motor/Assy unscrew fasteners electrical wiring
Film Drive Unscrew flex coupling and Done 0 0
Motor remove motor
Motor Control Box Remove 4 hold down screws None 0 0
X'-REA Assembly Disconnect electrical cables Redesigned connectors 2.7 6.0
and release latches and hold down latches
Printed Circuit Remove Phillips Hd screws None 0 0
Boards on sidecover and remove
Be Analog -Disconnect electrical leads None 0 0
Module and yerriove 4r cap screws
Al Analog Same as Be Module None 0 0
Module
Motor Drive Disconnect wiring and lift out None 0 0
Assembly assembly
Camera Disconnect cables and remove Similar to X REA 2. 7 6.0
Electronics latches assembly
Assembly
Printed Circuit Remove side cover and lift None 0 0
Boards out
ESTIMATED TOTAL WEIGHT IMPACT 9. 1 20.`
documented data are related to the X-ray event analyzer electronics unit
(Ref. 5-10). However, even this falls short of a total_ subassembly,, concen-
trating on a few discrete elements, such as power supplies and digital signal
conditioners.
Except for the thermal control system, the 5-056 X-ray telescope
with the X-ray event analyzer is composed of a series of single string ele-
ments.	 The failure of any one element will, in general, preclude continued
operation, or at best, will allow only limited data acquisition. 	 Even where
manual workarounds are provided, there is still a heavy dependr ynce upon'
timers, logic circuits, and motor drive amplifiers that again are single string.
Therefore, the approach taken was to block out the basic functions to the sec-
ond and third levels, as shown by the example in Figure 4-12. 	 Where formal
reliability estimates could be obtained they were utilized. 	 Judgment was then
employed where these estimates were not available.
Although there are numerous single point failures in the electronics,
this is not the principle area of concern. 	 Generally electronic components are
very reliable relative to electro-mechanical components, and it can be antici-
pated that this situation will continue to exist in the future.
	
In addition, any
argument developed here based upon the electronics would be open to question
,i
because redundancy is relatively easy to achieve even if initial reliability esti-
mates were low.
	
On the other hand, mechanical components have a relatively }
slow improvement rate primarily because of their ,unique applications and lack
of extensive test data on a large population. 	 Redundancy in mechanical systems
i
is not easily achieved and, in fact, is seldom addressed.	 For the record, how-
ever, it is interesting to note the reliability characteristics of the various power
supplies as summarized in Table 4-2.	 There are a minimum of 22 single point i
failures associated with the input stage of the various power supplies and from i
26 to 67 single point failures on the output stage.
	
Since each power supply per-
forms a specific task, the loss of a single unit would be catastrophic. L
Gathering what information is available results in the expected failure
rates shown in Table-4-3 for the X-ray event'analy:er and the X-ray telescope
assemblies, exclusive of the thermal control systems.
	
The incandescent r
lamps' and stepper motors were particularly suspect.	 There are 44 lamps
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Single Pt. Failures
Experiment Power Supply Reliability*
Input Output
X-Ray 20 Volts 0.9990 25 28
Telescope -5,	 +3. 1,	 +7.0,	 +1.9 0.9986 22 60
6 Volts 0.9989 25 31
X-Rea High Voltage (2) 0.9983 43 67
+5 Volts 0.9990 25 31
+12 Volts 0.9989 25 26
-6 Volts 0.9990 25 31
±12, +28, +29 0.9984 22 42
*Period of Performance
•	 2-56 Day Periods
•	 Conditional Upon Insertion
•	 All Parts Derated (No Redundancy)
Table 4-2. 5-056 Power Supply Reliability Characteristics
that provide a digitalized set of data on each frame. The loss of a lamp is
equivalent to the loss of a, digit in an eleven-bit binary word that could present
difficulty in reconstructing the record after operation. Since there is no way
to monitor these lamps, it wouldbe difficult to determine when the sequence
was interrupted thereby allowing some other form of record keeping to be
instituted. It may be possible to lose one or two lamps and stUl be able to
reconstruct therecords; it appears unreasonable to expect a reconstruction
i of the record if more than two lamps are lost. Consequently, the system
reliability has been estimated on the basis of 42 of 44 lamps being operational.i	 aThis creates a substantial impact on the reliability estimate. The results for 	 a
various mission durations are shown in Table 4-4. The nominal mission was
originally specified as 112 days, although, the instrument in fact operated
longer than this.
;
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Table-4-3. S-056 Expected Failure Rates
Subassembly Failures per 10 6
 Hrs-^
X-RaY Event Analyzer
Digital Signal Conditioner 22.05
Al Pulse Processor 1.42
Be Pulse Processor 1.82
Power Supplies 5.48
X-Ray Telescope
Camera/Thermal Control Electronics 30. 77
Incandescent Lamps (per cycle)** 1.0
Stepper Motors (per cycle)'** 0.33
*Operational Duty Cycle = 0. 625 of Orbit Period
**Based upon 4 magazines of film @ 7200 frames each
'**Six motors with total number of steps appro:;imately 4. 9 x 105
The data block lamps have, in this example, a predominate effect on
the reliability estimate. A. new design, 'instigated with current technologies,
would probably use light emitting diodes (LEDs) or some alternate more
reliable approach. This would have a substantial impact on the reliability
estimate. Also, further investigation has indicated the stepper motors may
have: a lower failure rate than estimated, although substantiating test results
are not available. Consequently, these values of reliability might be
considered very conservative if not for other extenuating factors
The reliability of the proportional counters (2) in the X-ray event {
analyzer is not available, but these components are well known for their wear
out characteristics. The incoming photons impart energy to ionize the gas in
the proportional counters. _ After receiving a high but finite number (approxi-
mately 1091 of photons, the characteristics of the proportional counter change
in an unpredictable manner, causing a baseline reference <shift. In addition,
F	 there are no data relative to mechanical problems, similar to those that
4-23
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Table 4-4. S-056 Estimated Reliability
Subsystem
Mission Duration, Days
30 112 360
Camera/TC Electronics 0. 986 0.95 0.846
Data Block
44 Lamps Required 0.712 0.2$2 0.017
42 Lamps Required 0.995 0.865 0.227
Stepper Motors 0.957 0.850 0.592
X-Rea 0.986 0.950 0.846
Mission Reliability
44 of 44 Lamps 0.663 0.22 0.01
42 of 44 Lamps 0.926 0.66 0.10
occurred in practice as discussed in Section 5. Therefore, these and other
factors reinforce the position that the low reliability estimate is not unrealis-
tic for systems of this complexity. More depth is desirable but for the present,
these estimates will have to be employed and later (Section 7) treated as a
variable.
,I In summary, the probability that the ` S- 056 experiment will operate
successfully for the defined 112-day mission has been estimated to be approx -
imately 22 percent. As a point of reference, this is not inconsistent with
i
	
	 USAF satellite programs designed during the same time frame. The satel-
lites are, in general, designed for a two-year life, but there are also several
redundant_.paths. Consequently, even though the S-0-56 flight experience was
` j
	
	 considerably better than this, (as discussed in Section 5) this value ,(227 0) is
not considered unrealistic as a point of reference. It is also interesting to
r'
	
	
note that the majority of problems that did occur with the ATM instruments
would not have been exposed in a classical reliability analysis anyway.
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Improvements can be expected in the future, but three factors mitigate against
a significant increase in reliability. The system complexity will inherently
increase, the equipment will continue to push the forefront of technology on
sensors, and the operating time on orbit will be extended. Hence, although
electronics and other components can be expected to improve in reliability,
single string failures will continue to be in abundance and the overall system
reliability should not be expected to exceed 50 percent at best.
Therefore, it should be the general practice in the future to design
for access to mechanical subassemblies, in particular, and electronic sub-
assemblies in general Where access to electronics is not possible,
redundancy or alternate paths should be employed. Also, a very important
factor is commonality of components to ease replacement and spares
provisioning. There are, for example, six stepper motors in the S-056
experiment. Three are identical in the telescopeassembly and two are
identical in the event analyzer. Each steps through a specified number of
degrees upon command. The drive amplifiers are also very similar. It
should be possible to make these components interchangeable so that a s_r:gle
spare could be employed in several areas. The same is true of power
supplies. The number of different power supplies (8) should be reduced, and
commonality of units or P.C. boards should be employed. These would not
have imposed any severe constraints on the S-056 but since maintenance was
not an objective, there was little incentive for commonality.
Finally, in consideration of future applications, there is a school
of thought with experience behind it that emphasizes that failures are seldomi
random but instead represent design or manufacturing deficiencies. We learn
from these failure occurrences, but the challenge of new designs appears to
always harbor this basic characteristic. Therefore, the risk associated with
unique, immature systems is inherently high, independent of reliability esti
mates. Until the system can be brought to ms.turity, it is only prudent to retain
l;	 the option to service the system by removing and replacing failed subsystems.
	
9
The penalty incurred in the design process should be easily offset by the
extended life and availability of the system, if in fact repair is required.
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4. 5	 APPLICATION TO OTHER ATM EXPERIMENTS
In c.rc?;;r to reinforce the results obtained from the S-056 analysis,
the effort was directed to analyze four additional ATM experiments, Detail
design drawings were obtained from Ball Brothers Research Corporation
„ !	 (Ref. 11 -14). Figure 4-13 lists the experiments examined, and shows their
R,
general placement within the ATM cannister. The maintainability impact
	 }
assessment was performed without the benefit of a redesign of each instru-
ment. Rather, the design was examined in depth and subassemblies or com-
ponents were identified that could be considered likely to require replacement.
An estimate of the weight impact was then performed based on the knowledge
gained from the S-056 effort.
An example of this is given in Figure 4-1.4, showing an exploded view
of the S-082B Spectrograph and XUV Monitor. Each subassembly was assessed
relative to alignment tolerances, access for replacement, and cable routing.
Consideration was also given to maintaining the continuity of the thermal con-
''
	
	 trot system, including removal of thermal control panels. The results were
tabulated, similar to Table 4-1 for the S-056, and are presented in Appendix 1.
The respective weight impact for each instrument is provided in Table 4-5.
The weight impacts are considerably higher than for the S-056 due primarily
to more electronic subassemblies, each requiring a latch mechanism, handle, y
and electrical connector housing. The weight changes are considered to be
	 a
1
Table 4-5. Weight Impact for Servicing
Experiment Initial Wt. ,
kg
Weight Increment,
kg`
Percent
Change, To
S-056 133 9 7
S-052' 145 38 26
S-055 159 47 29
S-082A 136 29 21
S-082B 192 70 36
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Figure 4-14. Spectograph and XUV Monitor Experiment S082B
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1extremely conservative since repackaging could probably be used to reduce
the number of connectors. The weight impact varies from _21 to 36 percent
as compared with 7 percent for the S-056.
In general, the volume changes were trivial for the instrument itself,
but access would be required beyond that provided in the ATM.
These results emphasize the need for care in configuring an instru-
ment for maintenance. It would be difficult to justify a 36 percent increase in
weight unless a thorough reliability analysis could substantiate this as the
only means of achieving a high availability. It has been estimated, however,
that these values could be reduced by proper design to approximately one-
half of the quoted values, or approximately 15 percent. For example, many
of the electronic components can be packaged together; reducing the attach-
me' t, handle, and connector weights. This incremental weight increase will
t	 undoubtedly, pay off in terms of increased reliability as opposed to use of
redundancy as shown later in Section 7.
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5. MAINTENANCE ASSE^SSIvENT
ii
;
5.1	 SELECTION OF INSTRUMENTS
The previous sections have provided the general description of the
i three candidate payloads of interest, with emphasis on the S-056 X-ray tele-
scope.
	
This section addresses the actual anomaly experience and relates
corrective action possibilities to the failure occurrences.	 As will be pointed
out later, the majority of anomalies that occurred in practice were not iden-
tifiable through classical reliability analysis.
The purpose of this effort was to relate the failure occurrences with
the respective actions taken and relate these in a quantifiable manner relative
to the basic characteristics of the equipment.	 This serves two purposes:	 an
assessment of the fundamental character of these types of instruments relative
to mission objectives, and as a source for improving failure assessment tech-
niques, as shown in Section 7.
	
Emphasis has been placed on the role mar_ 	 {
played, either , remotely or by direct action, in maintaining an operational sta-
J tus even after repeated failure occurrences. 	 This involved detailed discus-
sions with the Principal Investigators and Skylab crew members, as well as,
aa review of Skylab experience (Ref. 15-17).	 {
The basis for evaluation of manned maintenance capability used in
. this study is a comparison of three representative space-based experiments
with various_ degrees of manned involvement. 	 The three experiments selected,
as described in Section 3, were widely different in the degree of operational
maintenance possible, but we ,,e very similar in function and purpose such that
common criteria could be developed for forming a rational judgment.	 These
criteria resulted in definitions, discussed in detail below, that permitted a
numerical comparison of the experiments in terms of "complexity of opera-
tions" and "maintenance effectiveness." Although the following definitions are
necessarily arbitrary, they are sufficiently objective to provide a consistent
method of comparing instruments and evaluating performance. The methods
e
;Y
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developed for this study are unique for the instruments used; a similar
approach, using different parameters, maybe of value when evaluating other
systems.
Selection of the instruments evaluated was made to ensure that they
were similar but employed significantly different degrees of manned support.
The choice was restricted by requiring that one of them was flown on Skylab
and employed manned maintenance. Three categories of maintenance were
used in the selection; 1) automatic or nearly automatic systems with no main-
tenance possible except for switching operations; 2) semi-automatic with man-
ned operation via telemetry; and 3) semi-automatic with direct manned support
and partial maintenance in orbit. As previously mentioned the examples se-
lected for these categories were the OV 1-10, -17, OSO-7 and the S-056 on	 f
the Skylab/ATM. The X-ray experiments on W i -10 and OV1-17 were spec-
trometers that measured the spectral flux from the whole sun in the soft X-ray
region of about 7-30A. The OSO-7 experiment was a scanning spectrometer
that obtained' spectral scans of selected areas in the 2-40A interval. The S456	 s
experiment obtained X-ray pictures of the whole sun in the 3-30A band:	
1
The approach taken in this effort was to break down the two major
parameters,, Maintenance Effectiveness and Complexity, into sub-elements
that could be related to the actual design of the instrument and its operational
experience. Judgment was required in several instances, but wherever pos-	 3
sible, the parameters relate to measurable items. These parameters are
then quantified and summed to obtain a graphic relationship of man's contri-
bution to the success of the mission. These results are then extrapolated to
examine what further improvement, if any, could have been realized had the
equipment been designed for maintenance. This provides a basis forinter-
preting experienced failures relative to predicted failures and aids the sub-
sequent tradeoffs presented in 'Section 7.
q
-
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5. 2	 MAINTENANCE EFFECTIVENESS DEFINITIONS
The parameters that were used to define maintenance effectiveness
E
are:
1.	 Period of Operation (Po).
	 The length of time the experiment
operated and obtained some useful data.
	 By normalizing to
the expected lifetime, Po, equal weight is given to operations
of fixed duration such as the ATM and of unspecified duration
such as the OSO.	 This does not limit the value of the period
of operation that can be extended by maintenance.
2.	 Quality of Data (Q L)-	 Maintenance can obviously affect quality
of the data and hence the effectiveness of the experiment.
	
The
parameter has been assessed on a scale of 0 - 4 as follows:
	
4
(0) no usable data were obtained, (1) important parts of the ex-
	 3
periment failed and did not obtain any data, or most of the data
	 I
were inferior or missing, (2) part of the data are of inferior
quality which would compromise the scientific objectives and
limit its usefulness, -(3) data are of excellent quality but in-'
complete because of malfunctions that occurredin operation,
(4) data are excellent in every respect and all data planned`
were obtained so that scientific objectives could be realized.
3.	 Quantity of Data (QN).
	 The total quantity of data obtained by
° the instruments expressed in bits. 	 For analog data or film
in the form of pictures, this is the bits obtained from conver-
sion to digital format.
	 This number is weighted by some scale
factor or normalized to a similar data base, QNo.
4,	 Nurrioer of Repairs Made (NR). 	 Repairs made to the instru-
ments by operational or program procedures through telemetry
commands or by manned maintenance.	 Each repair is counted,
k even if recurrent, but a weighting factor is applied that
estimates the importance of the repair relative to the total
function of the instrument. 	 Maximum value for a repair is
1.0 if the instrument were totally inoperative before the re -
pair was made and fully operable afterward.
5.	 Redundancy (R) .
	
Back-up or alternate parts or systems that
E were used during operations to replace a component that failed.
A repair made by redundancy is counted. only once and a -weight-
ing factor is applied that estimates the i.mportanc:c of the repair
relative to the total function of the instrument. 	 Maximum value
is 1.0 as in parameter 4 above.
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	 Operational Manpower (OM). The manpower required to
operate the experiment averaged over an extended period
in units of man-months/month. This indicates the average
number of personnel necessary to perform observations
with the instrument including the fraction of support per -
sonnel who contribute to the observations
The use of these parameters in defining maintenance effectivenes s
is based on the following relationship
( P/PO ) + QL Ln QN/QN / + i +-EF(N R ) + i ;+ EH(R)^
__	 C	 AC	 IC
ME	 OM + (TR/ P) 	 (1)
where the symbols are defined above and T R is the training, in man-months, i
required to operate the experiment, as defined in , Section 5. 3, paragraph 4.
The terms of equation (1) have been made dimensionless by normalization to
appropriate factors. In addition, the quantity of data, QN, has been weighted
b the logarithm to base ey	 	 of the ratio QN /QNo	 owhere QN is the total data in
bits obtained by the OV1 -10 satellite. This choice for the data quantity param-
eter is based on the estimate that the value of data to the scientific objectives
decreases with increasing volume. This quantity weighting factor will be dif=
ferent for each type of experiment on test, and will depend on use of the data
in analysis. For communications instruments, for example, each data bit is
equally valuable and no weighting would be given. For scientific and techni-
cal instruments, however, value of the data will depend on both quantity and
epock for time dependent investigations. Repeated observations of equal
quality will not increase their value in satisfying program objectives and will
diminish overall effectiveness by recording unused data. For the solar ex-
,`
	
	 periments evaluated in this study, the estimate by the Principal .Investigators
and knowledgeable scientists working with the data was that the value would
decrease exponentially beyond some lower bound. Values of maintenance
effectiveness, ME , for the OVi-10, OV1-17, OSO-7 and S-056 X-ray experi
gr. merits are given in Table 5-1.i
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Payloads
Parameter
OVi-10 OV1-17 OSO-7 S-056
1) Period of
Operation (P/ I o) 7.2/6 = 1.2 0.5/6 = 0.08 29/12 = 2.4 9/8.2 = 1. 1
2) Quality of 2 1 2 3Data (QL)
3) Quantity of 107' - 5. 5 x 106 5. 04 x 109 5.57 x 1011Data (Q N )
4) Number of 0.5- 0 -0.9 3'
Repairs (NR)
5) Redundancy (R) 1 -1 4 6
6) Operational 1 1 4 6Manpower (OM)
7) Training (TR) 0.25 0.25 4 6
ME 3.59 1.43 4.29 6.13
Reference Value of Q 
0
The value of effectiveness of maintenance derived from equation (1),
in addition to being somewhat arbitrary, is not sufficient to characterize these
	
	
;t
x.
It	 experiments because of the differing degrees of manned operations and instru-
ment complexity. As indicated above, these experiments can be put in three
categories determined by the degree of manned maintenance: 1) automated with
manned operation limited to switching control and no maintenance or repair;
2) automated but with complete manned operational control via telemetry, and 	 ;Y
with possible maintenance and repair through switching and redundancy; and
3) semi-automated with complete manned operational control and with limited 	 r
}
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manned maintenance and repair. because of the s'gnificant differences in
instrument operations and complexity between these experiments, additional
parameters were defined to characterize maintenance and operations
complexity.
5.3	 INSTRUMENT COMPLEXITY DEFINITIONS
The parameters developed for this were:
1. Number of Components, (NC ). The number of subsystems of
the experiment that were separately packaged. Various items
with different functions but enclosed in one box are counted
only once. External support systems, mountings or monitor-
ing equipment are not counted as a component of the experiment.
2. Number of Modes (NM). The number of operating modes that
the instrument isdesigned to provide. These modes may be
automatic, semi-automatic or manual provided that they can
be achieved without permanent changes in planned instrument
operations, and can be used repeatedly. Calibration or test
modes used to evaluate instrument performance are not counted'
as part of the number of operating modes.
3. Number of Instructions (NI ). Total number of operating in-
structions that can be given to the instrument in making obser-
vations. Phis includes switching between modes of operation
as well as for calibration and test. Switching and sequencing
done by_ the-instrument during a standard mode of;operation are
not counted as instructions Each external switching that
changes the operating characteristics of the instrument is
counted as an instruction if it is used individually to control
the instrument. If it is part of a sequence of switching to
achieve a change, individual switches are not counted
separately.
4. Training Required (T R ). Training, in man-months, required
to instruct a qualified person to use the instrument effectively
for routine operations. It is presumed that the individual has
prior experience in working with space-flight experiments and
is knowledgeable about terminology and technology associated
with the instrument. Training of manpower required to oper-
ate telemetry, communications, data recording, and related
support operations are not counted as part of this category.
5-6
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35. Automation (A). The number of steps in the instrument
operations that provide for automatic switching or sequencing
to accommodate observational changes or malfunction. This
function is for responding to unscheduled changes in routine
operations that are usually associated with instrument logic
functions, such as, gain changes, and data rate. It also in-
'.
	
	 eludes transfer to alternate modes of operation or switching
in parallel or back-up subsystems in the event of failure.
6. Data Rate (DR). The data rate of the instrument in bits per
second averaged over the lifetime of operation. For analog
data, conversion to digital data is required to determine the
bit rate. Data on film are determined by computing the bits
required to digitize the image frame with a microdensitometer
used for data reduction and counting the number of frames ob-
tained. Resolution of the densitometer should equal the reso-
lution in the image.
7. Design Constraints (D C ), Limitations placed on the instrument
design such as configuration, size, and weight, in order to
conform to requirements of the satellite. This parameter has
an arbitrary scale of 1 5 with increasing number correspond-
ing to greater limitations. Estimate of this factor is based on
comparison with other flight instruments and the investigators
estimates of design constraints, 	 j
8. Instrument Requirements (IR). Complexity of the instrument
with regard to its function and operation. Examples of these
are unpointed, spin stabilized,- pointed and stabilized, scanned,
time and space correlated with other instruments on the satel-
lite or ground, and instrument type, e, g., optical, radio, and
charged particle. The scale of this parameter is 1 to-5 with
increasing number corresponding to greater requirements.
Estimate of the value is based on comparison with other
instruments.
9. Instrument Objectives (IO). The number of scientific and tech-
nical objectives of the instrument measured by the different
types of data collected. Each type of data obtained is counted
even if it came from the same source, , i. e . , solar, stellar, and
atmospheric.
Values of these complexity parameters for the OV1-10, OV i -17,
OSO-7 and S -056 are given in Table 5-2. The complexity, C, is computed
from a 'linear sum of the parameters defined above with certain weighting
factors assigned to prevent any single factor from being dominant. Although
this weighting is necessarily arbitrary, it is consistent. The value of C is
given by
5_7
t
EC NC
 + NM /IO + NI/ 10 + '1
"
R +A + Log 10 DR /D R0 
+ DC + I 	 (2)
and is listed in Table 5-2 for the foi^r instruments evaluated.
j
t	 Table 5-2. Complexity Factor, C
Payloads
Parameters OVi=10 -- OV1-', 17 OSO-7 S-056
Number of Components (NC ) 2 3 7 6
Number of Modes (NM) 1 2 6 11
Number of Instructions (NI) 1 2 34 46
Training Required (T R ) 0.25 0. 25 4 6
Automation (A) i 1 0 1
Data Rate (D R ) 25 2.0 x 10 2 2.0 x lot 3.7 x 1o4
i
Design Constraints (D C ) 2 2 3 4
Instrument Requirements (I R ) 2 2 2 3
Number of Objectives (I0) 1 1 2 2
C 8.35 11.4 23.3 33.31
These results are shown in Figure 5-1 where they are plotted as
instrument comp
	
Ylexit versus maintenance effectiveness. A trend line drawn
through the OV 1-10,- OSO-7 and S- 056, points shows a significant increase in
ME associated with the greater involvement of man in the maintenance of these
instruments. OVi -17, which was considered a failure in terms of meeting
scientific objectives, is well below this curve.
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Based on the analysis, minimum values of C and M E can be
established for instruments that are launched successfully and that function 	 .
properly during part of their designed lifetime. For complexity, this value
is 4 representing the lower bound to the parameters that define C in Equa-
tion (2). For maintenance effectiveness, this minimum value is about 3 for
an instrument that functioned properly during its planned lifetime and re-
quired no maintenance actions. These minimum values of ME and C are
also shown in Figure 5-1. The region below M E equal 3 represents instru-
ment failure and includes OV1-17.
To provide additional data for evaluating the manned contribution to
maintenance and determining consistency of the model, other experiments on
the ATM were analyzed using the definitions given above and Equations (1) and
(2). Results of this analysis are given in Table 5-3 for the six additional ex-
periments of ATM. These values show typical experimental dispersion for
data obtained by instruments with similar purposes but dissimilar methods of
operation. Except for the S-082B experiment, both the complexity, C, and
the maintenance effectiveness, ME, parameters for these experiments are
consistent. The significant factor in the S-082B was the relatively small
amount of data it obtained which resulted in a lower value for ME.
Plots of these parameters versus maintenance effectiveness and
complexity are given in Figures 5-2 and 5-3. Each of the parameters of ME
and six of C are shown in theFigures. Data points taken from Tables 5-i,
5-2, ^ and 5-3 are indicated in the plots by the following symbols: + for the
ATM experiments, and O for the OV 1-10, 17, OSO-7 and S-056, The solid
line is drawn to show trends for the data points and is based on a curve of
1
best fit. These plots are useful in postulating such values for other
instruments.
	
-
Figures i5-2-and 5-3 indicate that use of the analysis developed in
this study for a narrow range of instruments used for solar X-ray observa-
tions can be extended to include other types of related instruments. The 	 j
trends shown by the data are significantly more consistent than typical scatter
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PAYLOADSPARAMETERS
5-052 S-054 S-055A S-056 S-082A S-082B
COMPLEXITY
1)	 No. of Major Components 6 8 4 6 4 5
2)	 No. of Modes 5 4 4 11 4 4
3)	 No. 'of Instructions 29 24 19 46 21 31
4)	 Training Required 4 6 6 6 12 12
5)	 Automation 1 0 0 1 0 0
6)	 Data Rate 2. 90 x 10 3 2. 37 x 104 2.40 x:103 3. 70 x 104 1. 67 x 104 50
7)	 Design Constraints 4 4 4 4 4 4
8)	 Instrument Req'ts. 3 2 2 3 2 2
9)	 No. of Objectives 1 1 1 2 1 2
Complexity Factor C, 28.0 29.4 23.9 33.3 30.9 28.4
EFFECTIVENESS OF
MAINTENANCE ,
1)	 Period of Operation 1. 1 1. 1 1. 1 1. 1 1. 1 1. 1
2)	 Quality of Data 3.5 4 4 3 4 3.5
3)	 Quantity of Data 6.86x 10 10 ' 115. 31 x 14 103. 18 x 10 115. 57 x 10 113. 75 x 10 1. 12 x 10 9
4)	 No. of Repairs Made 4 4 1 3 3 2
5)	 Redundancy 1 0 9 2 1 1
6)	 Operational Manpower 5 5 7 6 5 5
Maint. Eff. Factor ME 7.17 8.93 5.91 6.13 7.78 3.57
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Figure 5-2.	 Manned Maintenance Effectiveness Parameters for
L
I
Selected Experiments
_
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diagrams of random statistical data. Since all of the points are fit approximately
by a slope =intercept line, this indicates a linear relationship between M E and
the maintenance parameters, and C and the complexity parameters. This re-
sult is consistent with the assumptions of Equations (1) and (2) that the weight-
ing factors used would give a linear response to the parameters,
5.4	 MANNED CONTRIBUTIONS TO MAINTENANCE
In using these results to evaluate the effectiveness of manned mainte
nance, it is essential to examine the failure histories of the experiments that
t
	 significantly affected performance and data. Typical failures for the four X-
i	 ray type instruments are shown in Table 5-4. Each of these failures resulted
in significant degradation of the instrument and required maintenance (where
possible) or alteration of the operational mode to minimize loss of data. For	 -
each failure, manned maintenance was attempted and every option exercised
to correct the problem or to minimize the impact on instrument operation and
scientific objectives. The effect of these failures was incorporated into the
analysis in estimating the contribution of manned maintenance.
Figure 5-4 is a plot of the complexity for the experiments studied
versus the effectiveness of maintenance. Values for the plotted points of the
Figure are given in Tables 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3 with the inclusion of failure ef-
fects listed in Table 5-4. The open square points showthe true values of C
3
and ME experienced by the three classes of X-ray experiments an e1 the solid
curve shows the trend line for these types of experiments.
The solid lines for ME equal 3 and C equal 4 represent minimum
values as explained above. Based on the definitions developed in this study
and Equation (2), instrument systems with complexity less than 4 would be
marginal or incomplete. Likewise, such a system with maintenance effec-
tiveness less than 3 would be considered as a failure. Thus OV1-10, OSO-7,
and S-056 would all have failed without manned maintenance to correct mal-
functions early in the flights. OV1-17 could not be repaired and is classed as
a failure.
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The additional points in Figure 5-4 are for computed values of ME
that would have occurred if maintenance were different from that achieved.
In the absence of any maintenance, all of the X-ray instruments would have
been below ME	 r.equal 3, hence, failures.	 These a-e the open circles in the
shaded region of the figure near ME equal 1.	 For the 5-056, repair of the
shutter door resulted in increasing ME to the intermediate value of about 3
and a second repair increased it to its final value of 6. 1.
	 The real values
I for ME resulting from actual maintenance are shown by the open square
points, that lie on or near the solid trend line curve.
	 Values of ME for hypo-
thetical maintenance for OSO-7 and S-056 are shown by the circular points
above the trend line.	 For OSO-7, two repairs to the magnetic electron mul-
tipliers (MEM) are shown and for the S-056, a filter repair is shown.
	 If
100 percent maintenance had been achieved, the solid circle point would have
occurred.	 Data for the S-055, S-0828, S-052 and S-054 experiments on ATM
are also included and indicated by the triangle points._
The values of the maintenance effectiveness parameters used in
Figure 5-2 for the OSO-7 and S-056 are listed in Tables 5-5 and 5-6.	 The
column labeled reference condition is for the actual case. 	 For the OV1-10,
the reference condition was equal to the 100% maintenance case since failure
occurred after the nominal lifetime. 	 Results for these three instruments
showing the effectiveness of maintenance based on the data of Tables 5-5 and
5-6 are plotted in histogram format in Figure 5-5.	 This figure clearly shows
the marked improvement achieved by manned maintenance and the, potential
for increasing effectiveness by complete maintenance and repair. 	 None of
these instruments was fully man maintained and, except for minimal redun-
dancy, no repair was possible for a failed part. 	 However, the maintenance
available was adequate to ensure that the OV1-10, the OSO -7, and the S-056
were successful to varying degrees. 	 Had this maintenance not been available,
all instruments would have failed before obtaining any significant data.
t
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LA
LAUNCH
FAILURE
REFERENCE
CONDITION
I, st MEM
REPAIR
2nd MEM
REPAIR
3rd MEM
REPAIR
1.	 PERIOD OF OPERATION 0 29/12 = 2.4 2.4 2.4 2,4
2.	 QUALITY OF DATA 0 2 2.5 3 4
3.	 QUANTITY OF DATA 0 5.04 x 10 9 67/44(1) 82/44(1) 87/44(1)
4.	 NO. REPAIRS MADE 0 0.9 1: 9 2.9 3. 9
5.	 REDUNDANCY 0 0 0 0 0
6.	 OPERATIONAL MANPOWER 4 4 1 4 4
ME 0.50 4.29 5.33 6.72 8.68-
(1) FACTOR USED TO RATIO QUANTITY OF DATA IN BASELINE
Table 5-6. Effectiveness of Maintenance for the 5056 X-ray Experiment
23-DAY
DOOR
FAILURE
DOOR
FAIL
EVA
REFERENCE
CONDITION
FILTER
REPAIR
USE ALL
FILM
1.	 PERIOD OF OPERATION 0.091- 0.366 9/8.2 = 1. 1 1.1 1.1
2.	 QUALITY OF DATA 1 2 3, 3.5 4
3.	 QUANTITY OF DATA 0.75/9(1)' 3/9(1) 5.57 x 1.0 11 1(1) 1,`32(1)
4.	 NO REPAIRS MADE 0 2 3 4
5.	 REDUNDANCY 2 2 2 2 2
6.	 OPERATIONAL MANPOWER -6 6	 - 6 6 6
ME , 0.90 3.25 6.13 7.10 8.24
s7
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Figure 5-5. Maintenance Effectiveness for Three
Types of X-ray Instruments
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lf	 The rectangular region of Figure 5-4 enclosed by the dashed line
defines an area of maintenance effectiveness and complexity characteristic
of limited manned maintenance realized by the ATM experiments. 	 It repre-
sents the range of levels achieved in the instruments evaluated based on actual
1
j
values of ME and C.	 Experiment S-082B fall's outside of this region; however,
it was designed for limited data, and consequently, lower ME.
	
Included also
in this region are the hypothetical points of ME for the OSO-7, and the other
ATM experiments, had complete maintenance and repair been provided. 	 This
includes the 100 percent maintenance case for perfect operation and maximum
data acquisition.
This region indicates the consistency of these ATM instrument param-
eters and the validity of the analytical method developed to measure the effec-
tiveness of manned maintenance for a. class of space -based instruments.
Since the method can be generalized,- it should be applicable to other systems
1	
used for scientific or technical measurements with partial manned mainte-
nance and repair.	 R —1.ults of this study can also be used to define boundary
values for future instrument systems that utilize man fully to maintain and
repair equipment.	 This can be seen in Figure 5-4 by the upper part of the
plot for the region bounded by the dashed lines at M E equal 8 and C equal 22.
This area includes the hypothetical points of 100% maintenance and repair if
{	 parts and capabilities had been available to repair or replace any failed part 
and all data possible were obtained.
	
This defines an area of ideal manned
maintenance that fully utilizes the capability of man in the operation of a
space-based system.
	
It is to this region that future manned space-based
experiments should be directed in order to achieve the highest level of scien-
tific and technical effectiveness and to optimize the value of a program based
on cost and effort to realize these goals.'
p	
^
w
i(
5-20
is	 j
6. MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY
6.1	 BACKGROUND
Since the contr-ibution,of man to the operation of any scientific or
technical instrument system extends beyond repair and maintenance, study
of his contributions to management was also included. The purpose of this
part of the study was to identify the functions of management in instrument
operations, and to evaluate the unique contributions of man for a space-based
	
a
system. This included a wide variety of levels of manned involvement in
management from simple switching functions to hands-on operation.
- -	 The method of evaluating management effectiveness developed for
this study is similar to that used for maintenance as described in Section 5.
Parameters adopted for tae management evaluation are based on discussions
with several of the Principal Investigators of the ATM experiments and
ground-based research groups who supported the Skylab missions as well as
one scientist-astronaut. From these discussions, six parameters were
selected that best define the unique contribution of man to the management
of space-based experiments.
6.2	 MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS DEFDIITIONS
The parameters used to define management effectiveness are:
1. Availability of Management (AM). The fraction, of total time
that manned attendance is available to supervise and operate
an instrument. This does not require continuous attention to
the details of operation but availability of man and access to
the instrument when necessary. The number of individuals
who participate in management of the experiment and operate
equipment is not a factor of this parameter. Alternate meth-
ods of remote operation are not included in determining AM.
2. Schedule Changes (SC). The number of times per day that the
f
	
	
operations crew instigated a change in the regularlyscheduled
observing or operating program to obtain other data. Such
- changes are made because of new information obtained from
real-time observations that occurred. after the daily planning
meeting. This information is developed from the space-based
x
6-
instruments and not from ground-based support observations.
Each change in observing is counted if it is not to return to the
regularly scheduled program.
	 -
3. Planning Observations (PO). The number of observations made
by the instruments per day and used for planning the daily ob-
serving program. 'These observations may be either in real
or post-time and used later. However, to be counted an ob-
servation must be used for planning even if not for the next
day. Observations that were made but not used are counted
if they were intended for use in planning.
4. Instrument Changes (IC ). The number of times per day that
changes in instrument operating mode were made to accom-
modate the observing program. This includes the regularly
scheduled program as well as the unscheduled changes in-
cluded in category 2 above. Routine mode changes associated
	 j
with a particular type of observation are not counted separately.
Repair or maintenance changes are not counted ir_ -his category.
5. Real-Time Observations (OB). The number of observations
made per day in real-time for technical or scientific purposes.
These observations are separate from those made in support
of planning observations in category 3 above. Duration of
these observations may be limited to telemetry passes over a
ground station and restricted to part of the complete
_instru-
ment system provided that they are examined by the operation's
	
3
staff.
6. Data Quality Increase_ (DQ). The incremental change in the
quality of data resulting from manned management of the ex-
periments. This is based on an estimate by the experimenter
of data quality enhancement. Quality includes all factors that
contribute to realizing the scientific objectives from data ob-
tained with the instrument. The scale of data quality is defined
in Section 5. 2, second paragraph.
Values obtained for these parameters for the OVi
-10, OSO-7, and
S-056 are listed in Table 6-1 with the value of MA	m, the management effective-
ness value. The definition of MA developed for this study is given by
F	 MA =AM +SC +PO +IC +OB +DQ	(3)	 j
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SYMBOL OV1-10 OSO-7 S056
1. AVAILABILITY OF MANAGEMENT AM 0.1 0.2 1.0
2. SCHEDULE CHANGES SC 0.1 0,5 0.5
3. PLANNING OBSERVATIONS PO 0 2.0 2.0
4. INSTRUMENT CHANGES IC 0 1.0 5.0
5. REAL-TIME OBSERVATIONS 0 1.0 2.0 1.0
6. DATA QUALITY INCREASE DQ 0 0 1.0
MA 1.2 5.7 10.5
NOTE: VALUES ARE GIVEN ON A PER DAY BASIS
i
where the terms of Equation (3) are defined by 1-through 6 above and no weight-
ing has been assigned any of the parameters. Plots of each of these param -
eters for the X-ray experiments versusMA are given in Figure 6- 1. Because
of the limited number of examples studied, trend lines have not been included,
as for maintenance parameters. It is evident that the management parameters
may not lead to a linear trend line, since program and mission objectives -will
determine the degree of manned management at the experiment level in flight. 	 ?
Therinci al purpose of these lots is to indicate variations in the individualP	 p P P	 P,	 ^
parameters for a program and instruments that can be used as guidelines in
SF
M
improving performance. The shaded, horizontal lines, in Figure 6-1, repre-
sent upper bounds for the trend lines.
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Figure 6-1. Management Effectiveness Parameters for the
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6. 3	 MANNED CONTRIBUTION TO MANAGEMENT
A plot of f1he management effectiveness parameter, MA, for the
iOV i -10, OSO-7, and S-056 versus the complexity for these experiments is
shown in Figure6-2. There is a marked increase in M A associated with
the increasing participation of man in the management of the experiments.
Based on the definition of MA from Equation (3), this result might have been
expected; however, the benefits to the program from increased management
I
effectiveness can be objectively assessed in evaluating_ both the numerical
estimate and the scientific accomplishments. In the latter category particu-
larly, the results indicate significant improvement with increasing manned
management.
This is verified by the ATM experience, that showed increased
reliance upon onboard management as the mission progressed.
The management function, like the maintenance function, can cer-
tainly be increased significantly by mission planning and instrument designs
that utilize man effectively. To do this, it is necessary to examine critically
how man can function in an optimum way in experiment operations, and to
develop a program with man as an integral factor and not as a spectator or
casual participant. Increased system complexity is inherent in the develop-
ment of new scientific instruments.
The need to improve management effectiveness as instrument com-
plexity increases is apparent from the trend line presented in Figure 6-2.
Special efforts must therefore be employed to exploit man's capability to
assure that the trend toward more effective operations is maintained. In
the limit, man should have the same freedom of management authority in
space as with existing ground-based observations.
r
i
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7. APPLICATION TO FUTURE PROGRAMS
c
The assessment of past programs, such as, the Skylab/ATM
experiments, provides valuable insight when considering future program
applications. This background has been employed in two ways; to establish
trends that show a value improvement with the introduction of manned sup-
port, and to assist in the definition of typical repair actions that would
improve the probability of achieving a high system availability. Both of
these approaches are presented in this section, each having its own merits
relative to the value of man in the role of orbital maintenance.
7.1	 EXTRAPOLATION OF HISTORICAL RESULTS
Results of this study to evaluate the effectiveness of man in manage-
ment and maintenance, as discussed in Sections 5 and 6, show a marked
improvement in both areas with increasing involvement of man. Based on the
analysis developed here, i, e. , to represent the results as a plot of the
effectiveness of man versus instrument complexity, this improvement can
be quantified and used to evaluate other systems and to provide guidelines
for future programs such as the STS. The consistency of these numerical
representations for a, small sample of similar instruments is particularly
encouraging for extrapolation to more complex instruments that utilize
man even more effectively. This latter possibility is particularly significant,
since none of the examples used in this study critically tested the full
potential of man in conducting space-based investigations. r
The Skylab/ATM was the most advanced system, to date in terms of
manned utilization. However, most of the instruments were not designed for
maintenance and repair, and many of the operations were sufficiently auto
matic that only monitoring was required. This resulted in significant a
improvement in performance over other unmanned instruments with remote
monitoring but was substantially less than could be achieved. For the ATM
instruments,, that could be compared with the OSO, the principal achieve-
ment was in simplifying; the operating controls by modifying telemetry and
'r
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command with the addition of manual switches. No advances were made in
operations or maintenance. Diagnosis of failures and repairs for the ATM
were similar to OSO except for simple mechanical adjustments, such as,
opening .a jammed door. No provision was made for replacing damaged or
failed parts, except for the cameras that were changed during EVA.
t An estimate of the additional gain in performance of the ATM for
the case of ideal maintenance, shown in Figure 5-4, indicates an upper bound
on effectiveness of manned utilization for typical ATM instruments. Although
there is dispersion in the values of the effectiveness parameters between the E
various ATM instruments, the consistency is sufficiently high to warrant
extrapolation to future systems that could, incorporate manned operation.
Future concepts should, in general, provide a substantial improvement in
performance with an inherent increase in complexity. This relationship
should follow the trend line of Figure 5-4. However, a necessary condition
for this to occur is the development of improved maintenance methods,
including diagnostic and testing techniques. Such techniques are routine in
ground-based systems where high availability is desired. Their inclusion in
space-based systems can provide the capability necessary to maintain highly
complex instruments and with an ME greater than eight as shown in the upper
part of Figure 5-4
7. 1. 1	 Empirical Value Function
A crucial factor in determining the level of performance is the cost
to achieve'it. Unless the value of a program,; measured in terms of results
obtained per unit of cost is optimum, alternate methods should be evaluated.
The difficulty in defining a value function is estimating what factors can be
counted as results and what weighting is assigned. For similarinstruments,
j	 such as those evaluated in this study, any consistent method can be used
E	 since the analysis is based on nearly identical results.
The method adopted for this study is based onquantity and quality of
C
	
	
data as the principal, product of the experiment with the cost of the instrument,
excluding vehicle launch costs, as the normalizing factor. The use of these
s
d
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parameters in defining value is based on the assumption that a program was
'	 successful if the instruments obtained all of the data desired and the quality
was high.	 Total data obtained in bits as defined in Section 5.2 	 were used
for quantity.	 As in Section 5, a weighting factor of log i0 was adopted to
limit the scale of data quantity which varies greatly. Further, as discussed
in Section 5, the value of data to the scientific and technical objectives of a
program will decline with volume.	 The exact formula for weighting the data 1
quantity factor will depend on the instrument and program- objectives.
	 For
the instruments evaluated in this study, either a log i0 or Lne appears
appropriate.	 Quality of data is equally critical to success of the program
and, _regardless of volume, will limit the ability of an instrument to satisfy
objectives.	 The scale of quality is 0-4 as previously discussed.	 The
numerical value of the value function is defined by:
Q
Value Function,	 V = Q 
	
log to ( M 	 (4)
where Q L is the quality of data-, QN is the quantity of data and M is the cost
of the experiment in dollars. 	 Values of QL and QN were defined in Section 5
and are tabulated in Table 5-1.
Values of V determined by Equation (4) for the O V 1-10, OSO-7 and
S-056 are shown in Figure 7-1.	 These are plotted versus the complexity for
each of these experiments as was done for ME and M A : 	 The trend line that
is drawn through the points shows a strong increase in value function for
increasing use of manned operations in maintenance and management. 	 These
results clearly demonstrate the advantages of manned operation based on the
parameters of data quantity and quality in satisfying the technical and
scientific objectives of the programs.
The increase in value function for these experiments is particularly
'	 I
A
"	 significant, since the cost of the experiments increased also. 	 These cost
increases, however, were less than the much greater increase in the
7-3
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Iscientific objectives realized by quantity and quality of data. For other
payloads with different objectives, the value function must be determined
€
from other parameters. In the future, costs can be expected to continue to
increase, and it will be necessary to develop methods of increasing the
return from instruments to keep the value function from declining. This can
I
	
	
occur if an optimum system can be developed that increases the management
and maintenance parameters as instrument complexity continues to increase.
The trend line in Figure 7- 1 indicates that with increasing com-
plexity greater value can be expected. This has obvious limitations since 	 3
the instrument complexity cannot be increased indefinitely for a .fixed level
of manpower. Examples of sophisticated ground-based systems can provide
guidelines for evaluating optimum space-based systems that extend the value
function without reducing success by excessivecomplexity. A study to
define possible operational methods for manned maintenance and management
y
could provide detailed data to estimate the complexity and value function for
systems beyond the ATM.
7.2	 MAINTENANCE REPAIR TRADEOFFS
The review of the Skylab experience as discussed in Sections 5 and 6,
and 'the redesign effort of Section 4 have provided the necessary background
to allow assessment of the overall reliability characteristics relative to the
benefits of space maintenance. These benefits can then be compared to
alternative measures of achieving proposed mission objectives that may
evolve in the future.
The results apply specifically to scientific equipment, similar to
the 5-056 X-ray telescope, that consist of unique concepts as opposed to
mature operational systems, such as communication satellites'. In addition,
because these types of instruments represent an extension of the Principal
Investigator's Laboratory, it should be recognized that it is difficult to
obtain valid reliability data relative to the sensor portions of the instrument.
And, as the experience of the ATM experiments prove, few of the failure
k	 occurrences would have been exposed by a-classical reliability analysis
6
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anyway. This merely emphasizes the need to improve and augment these
analytical techniques because hindsight has shown that with little impact on
the original designs, the vast majority of anomalies that did occur could
have been easily eliminated had they been considered. Also the reliability
of electronic components has improved to the extent that remaining problem
areas usually relate to mechanical and electro-mechanical elements that
are not readily made redundant.
Consequently, an alternate approach has been employed to arrive
at quantitative values that demonstrate the basic characteristics common
to these types of equipment. This approach employs a simplified Fault Tree
with a supporting failure assessment to demonstrate the basic character
of the S-056 instrument and relates this to the ability to meet the desired
mission availability. Availability, in this context relates to the ratio of the
time the instrument is operational relative to the planned operational period.
It is assumed that the quality and quantity of desired scientific data is
obtained under these conditions.
The S-056 Fault Tree is developed to the basic element block,
indicating typical failures that could be employed to develop the Tree further.
The top event is "Failure to Achieve Scientific Objectives" as shown in
Figure 7-2. In following this Tree, it should be remembered that all pos-
sible failures are not identified, only those that contribute to the top event.
Also, no account of failures induced by interface support equipment has been
considered, such as ATM power failures; the interest here is limited to the
S-056.
There are two reasons why mission objectives may be compromised:
failure s occur that are not detected and, therefore, stimulate no action during
eqi^lipment operation; and failures that are detected, but for one reason or
anothe r cannot be corrected. All occurrences can be grouped into these two
categories. Further, the principal interest lies in the area of incidents
requiring repair action rather than consideration of why the repair was not
performed. If a new design were being developed, this latter point would be
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Figure 7-2. S-056 X-Ray Telescope Fault Tree
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very important as it reflects on the ability to perform repair action given
that such action is required. However, the interest here is on the "Repair 	 .
Required" path to demonstrate the variety of failures that could occur.
This "inverse" thought process is characteristic of Fault Trees in
that the intent is not to establish how to ensure a system performs correctly
as in "success path" reliability diagrams, but rather which elements could
contribute to the top failure event. The first Tree (Figure 7-2) merely
establishes the organization to be followed on subsequent Fault Trees to
assure that all events and conditions lead to the top event. The Tree then
considers whatfailures could occur, irrespective of whether repair capa-
bility exists or. not. The AND gate, implies that repair could have been
performed but was not. Normally an AND gate implies a relatively low
likelihood of the failures propagating to the top event because two conditions
must exist simultaneously. However, this is rare in the case of the exist-
ing S-056;X-ray telescope because the equipment was not designed for
repair action, nor were spares available to support such action. Conse-
quently, in this instance, the repair action branch is of little interest,
pointing out only that if a new design were being considered, this branch
should be fully developed
i
In addition, the "Repair Not Feasible" is pursued only to the point
of demonstrating that certain failures of major structural items would also
cause failure of the mission  but their likelihood of occurrence is very low.
Finally, since there was no formal monitor and alarm system on the S-056,
most of the failures requiring repair would also show up on the Tree of
a
unmonitored failures. Although anomalies would be apparent on the control
panel, it would be very difficult to isolate the failures for repair action
based upon the available information. In general, the degree of isolation
required in conjunction with a repair capability is inversely related to she
repair level; the larger the replaceable unit,_ the less pre-cision required in
isolation of the fault.
The Fault Tree, ;therefore, develops primarily on the repair
required branch as shown in Figure 7-3. This Tree provides a view of those
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items that, if not repaired, could lead to failure of the mission. It should
be recognized that in the classical reliability sense, many of these conditions
are not quantifiable in terms of failure rates or failures pe± , cycle. These
are instead, problem areas that typically occur with complex scientific
E
	
	
space instruments. As such, the Tree provides a road map of potential
problem areas that should be closely scrutinized during the design and
testing periods. In the case of the S-056, many of the items on the Tree
represent hindsight, having the benefit of post flight assessments. However,
experience has shown that the elements of the Tree, although not extended in
depth, are representative of problem areas that should be observed in future
design efforts both for Spacelab and free flying instruments.
The Tree does serve another purpose: quantifying the effect of
various anomalies. If this were a preliminary design effort, expected
failures would be e c-timated for each block on the Tree and the Tree could
be used to aid in achieving a balanced design. Where valid information
exists, it is also possible, through Boolean algebra, to estimate the proba-
bility of occurrence of the top event. However, even with the lack of defin-
itive information and with engineering judgment, the Tree can be very useful
to demonstrate the influence of repair capability to preclude the top event
frorn occurring. This is accomplished in the following manner. Each of the
items on the Tree can be represented as contributing to the total unreli-
ability of the S-056. As presented in Section 4, the overall reliability of the
S-956 is estimated to be approximately 22 percent. This, of course, relies
heavily on experience because it is not possible to perform an indepth
	 -
arialysis, but it is felt to be realists and representative of these types of
instruments. Therefore, all of the elements represented on the Fault Tree
must compose the total unreliability of the system, or a probability of failure
of 78 percent. The _question then_ _is the distribution of the failures, and how
this distribution influences the ability of repair actions to maintain the
instrument.
The elements of the Tree are tabulated into a failure characteristic
G
table as shown in 'Table 7- 1. This is only a sample to demonstrate the
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Sub-Assembly Component Failure Modes RLOC ,'°
Single
Point
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
CAMERA Film	 -..,$,Drive fails to 6 Yes Yes Crew remove and replace, film
ASSEMBLY Magazine engage magazine assembly.	 If repeated
----	 - • Film take-up fails action fails to remove magazine,
due to nigh load terminate mission
• Film becomes brittle
•Idler sprocket drab
• Latching pawl fails
to engage
•Latching pawl fails
to disengage
Filter $ Loss of filter 5 Yes Yes Stepper motor and filter wheel are
Wheel material replaceable by manned action -
Step 'motor fails off manual adjustment of guides possi-
* Step motor steps ble with proper tool
improperly
Filter wheel jams
Rotary • Motor fails off 5 Yes Yes Remove and replace shutter wheel
Disc • Motor steps impro- or motor or shim to reduce shutter
Shutter perly guide frictionI Shutter guide frictio
Film Drive •Motor fails off 6 Yes Yes Remove/replace motor
_Assembly • Motor steps
improperly
4 Motor stalls
• Clutch fails to engag Condl Drive linkage in camera housingis
properly adjustable : film magazine is not.
Re place film magazine
I
__.A...	
_. _. p	 A	 ..
application. The complete table is provided in Appendix B. This table
relates each subsystem element to a Relative ,Likelihood of Occurrence
(RLOO), ranging from zero to ter... The value of this action is to provide a
point of reference that represents a "best judgment" of the weak points of
the design. This distribution will subsequently be altered to assess the
sensitivity of the assumed values for the _relative failure relationships.
There are 49 elements tabulated in Appendix B having a RLOO
between 1 and 10, (those elements with a-RLOO of less 1 have been elimi-
nated from consideration). These elements were used to develop the histo-
gram shown in Figure 7-4. Although the distribution is skewed, it is felt
to be representative of the S-056 X-ray telescope. If repair is to be 	 i
employed, consideration should be given first to components with a high
RLOO. Thus, this histogram provides an insight into spares provisioning,
and where emphasis should be placed on design modifications.
Figure 7-4 can be integrated to develop the expected repair poten-
tial as shown in Figure 7-5. This indicates that a 20 percent repair capa-
bility can easily accommodate a large portion of the expected failure
occurrences (40 percent). Beyond this, the rate of return on repair actions
dira.inishes, and to expect to compensate for all possible failures appears
unrealistic. The question of just how much repair is desirable is answered
by examining the basic reliability of the instrument relative to the desired
availability.
Figure 7-6 takes the initial reliability estimate and indicates for
the expected failure distribution how much repair should be incorporated to
achieve a reasonable system availability. The availability in this instance
is defined as the ratio of time the system was operationalto planned opera-
tional period. The desired availability for these types of instruments is
estimated to lie between 70 and 90 percent. Since these types of instruments
are generally one-of-a-kind, usually very complex in design and having
special requirements for unique sensors, it is unrealistic to expect avail-
abilities above 90 percent. With this goal in mind, 'it is seen that a 40
percent repair capability can be expected to substantially improve the
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Figure 7-6. S-056 Availability versus Relative Repair Capability
iexpected availability from 22 percent to over 60 percent. However, the
relative repair capability must be increased to approximately 75 percent to
achieve the desired availability.
It is unrealistic to consider a 100 percent repair capability, if for
no other reason than that of isolating all failure conditions such that the
proper repair action could be performed. All possible failures are not
incorporated into the assumed failure distribution, but the sample is suffi-
ciently broad to be representative of the failure characteristics and the
influence of repair actions. A more thorough "failure modes and effects
analysis" would probably uncover more component failure paths but should
not appreciably alter the shape of the curve, in Figure 7-5, 	 a
	For this set of conditions, repw it proves to be very attractive and	 j
a great deal of commonality of components exists in the design of the 5-056
X-ray telescope, thereby minimizing spares provisions. However, it is
always advisable to examine alternate failure distributions to determine the
sensitivity of the conclusions to the initial conditions. This is done by
referring to Figure 7-7. This figure shows typical distributions that could
occur as a result of changes in the component reliability assessment. If
the estimated component reliability were improved, the histogram would be
skewed to the left. This indicates that very few of the components have a
high RLOO. If the component reliability is reduced, the curve is skewed
to the right with a high percentage of the components having 'a potentially	 1
high RLOO. The curves have been constrained to all contain the same num-
ber of compone-ats to provide a consistent comparison with the reference
case.
_r
These distributions have then been integrated to provide an indica-
tion of component repair potential, as shown in Figure 7-8. If the compo-
nents are estimated to have a relatively high likelihood of failure, it is very
apparent that even a low repair capability provides substantial benefits.
However, if the reliability distribution were to improve, the "value' of
repair" is diminished unless a very high level of maintenancecan be achieved.
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These two curves, therefore, provide a reasonable bounds of influence of
"	 repair action on maintaining an operating system.
Figure 7-9 shows this effect relative to achieving the desired
availability. This shows that a repair capability, somewhere between 40
and 95 percent, would be desirable to achieve the preferred level of avail-
ability. Repair, in either extreme, still provides a substantial benefit.
However, improved system reliability (S-506) may also provide benefits
equal to that of active repair. Consequently, it is of interest to determine
the influence of adding redundant components to the S-056 relative to the
influence this will have on system availability.
In general, the first area considered for redundancy is the avionics.
The S-056 avionics package performs all automated sequencing, contains all
timers, all power supplies, and the thermal control system electronics.
There are numerous single point failures in this design. As previously
pointed out, each power supply contains from 20 to 60 single point failures.
The loss of any of the power supplies will cause termination of the mission.
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect a substantial improvement by use of
redundant electronics. The overall reliability estimate for the S-056 as a
function of data acquisition (operating period) is shown in Figure 7- W. This
curve utilizes component failure data wherever possible, but as pointed out
in Section 4, it is not possible to establish an accurate reliability estimate.
Nor is it felt necessary, because experience has shown that the majority
of failures occurred in electro-mechanical systems for which no reliability
estimates exist. Consequently, this curve is reasonably representative of
the S-056 X-ray telescope. The probability of acquiring all data is 22 per-
cent.. In practice, it is estimated that the 5-056 actually acquired approxi-
mately 75 percent of its planned data but this did in fact require manned
action as pointed out in Section 5.
If the avionics package is made totally redundant, the system reli-
ability will improve to about 26 percent. The ability to gather data
early in the program is enhanced; however, over the total period, the
E
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improvement would be considered negligible. As more redundancy is
incorporated, the overall reliability will improve, but at a substantial weight
penalty. Optimization of this process will be addressed later, but first
consider the influence of the initial reliability on the value of repair..
Since the initial value of the 5-056 estimated reliability of 22 per-
cent could not include all factors (for lack of definition) it is of interest to
see what influence a higher reliability would have on repair actions, assum-
ing it could be achieved. A system reliability of 60 percent was selected
as a point of reference, representing a substantial improvement over what
{
	
	
was estimated as the true reliability of the 5-056. A value above this is
questionable, because it is not obvious how redundancy would be incorporated
into the mechanical components (air lock door and motor, film drive, etc,). 1
Figure 7-11 provides an estimate of the influence of repair if thej
initial reliability were 60 percent. The distribution of failures remains the 1I same as before, but the higher reliability reduces the influence of repair
capability. The benefitsof repair are still very noticeable, but the incre-
mental improvement has obviously been depressed. If the component failure
distribution follows the high reliability curve, an extensive repair caps- 1
bility would be required before any substantial improvement could be
realized. Hence, over a wide range of initial system reliabilities, it can be
seen that repair actions can make a substantial contribution to the overall
mission. The question now is how to set a value on these contributions,
such that a valid conclusion can be drawn"
This has been accomplished by relating the weight penalty for
J	 i repair, or for redundancy, to the expected availability. Since the 5-056 is
the only instrument for which reliability estimates exist, it is employed in
this tradeoff. First consider redundancy s a means of improving reli-.y	 P	 g
ability. By taking a ratio of the incremental reliability to incremental weight
of a component, it is possible to optimize- the selection of redundant compo-
nents to minimize weight. Also, in adding a redundant component there are
additional weight factors to cover such items as connectors, brackets, etc.
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NThis therefore becomes the penalty function; the weight increase as a
l	 function of improved availability. 	 Although the weight of a given component
4
E	 can be identified, the incremental increase for interfaces must be treated
as a variable.	 This increment is estimated to vary between 25 and 50 per-4
cent of the basic component weight.
;
Hence, for the addition of redundant components, the penalty func-
tion selected is as follows:
z
Redundancy Penalty Function P. F. = WW
 , where
T
A
3	 AW = (1+K) NW Cs
Where
1
`E	 WC =weight of redundant component
K_ = weight factor, 25 percent or 50 percent
N _ number, of components added
W T	initial instrument weight .-
The situation `for repair, however, is quite different.
	 There is an
initial weight penalty associated with designing an instrument for repair in
k	 space.	 Although the values expressed in Section 4 are considered conserva-
tive, it is nonetheless necessary to account for this effect.
	 The incremental
q 
increase for the S-056 is estimated to be 9. 1 kg, ,or,
 7 percent of the original
'
s	 design weight.	 Any additional weight to be considered will be in the form
^i
of spares.
	 However, spares can take advantage ,
 of commonality of compo-
nents; there is a weight savings for such items as stepper motors, where
four are required in the camera and two in the X-ray event analyzer.
€
Consequently 	 substantial increase in reliability can be achieved with only
=	 a few spares.
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0The penalty function selected for repair action is therefore:
a
;
Repair Penalty Function P. F. -
	
OW , 
whereW T, 1
AW= W +K N W +K W
i.	 C	 i	 C	 2	 T
Whe re
kWC = weight of spare component
K 1	= weight factor associated with spares storage (5%)
N = number of spare components
K2	 = weight factor imposed on initial design forrepairability (7%)
W T = initial weight of instrument
The value function then becomes the ratio of the incremental weight
growth to the initial design weight of the instrument (133 kg) as the avail- 1
ability is increased.	 For all practical purposes ., this is the relative cost
i
impact of doing business.
The advantage of repair over redundancy is dramatically shown in j
Figure 7-12.	 The weight growth is shown as a function of the expected avail- a
ability of the instrument. 	 The initial weight impact to design for repair is
indicated by the step function of the repair curve. 	 However, after this point,
the system availability can be substantially improved with very little weight
growth, capitalizing on the commonality of spare items. 	 The desired range
of availability (70 to 9076) can easily be attained with the knee of the curve
at approximately 85 percent.;
The result of added redundancy is also dramatic. 	 Although there
may be an initial weight penalty for mounting supports, additional cold
plates, etc. , it was not possible to devote any design effort to this definition. u
a
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Figure 7-12,. Redundancy versus Repair for S-056 (Initial Rel. = 0.22)
t
Consequently, the initial weight impact of designing for redundancy has been
'
k
neglected.	 The optimum level of redundancy will provide approximately
55 percent availability, which also happens to be near the cross over point
1
with repair actions.	 It is obvious that a severe weight penalty would be
incurred if component redundancy were employed to achieve an availability i
of 70 percent or greater.
These results are, of course, sensitive to the initial reliability
estimate, as discussed previously.	 Consequently, this trend was also 	 t
examined for a higher level of initial reliability. 	 The results are shown in
Figure 7- B.	 Repair actions would provide a higher confidence of achieving
the desired availability because of the associated slope of the curve; how- r,
ever, the initial weight penalty is, in this case, a serious detriment. 	 The
redundancy curve shows a substantial benefit over repair since only a small
improvement in reliability is necessary, although the total weight savings
^ in practice would be less than 6 kg. 	 In this case, repair action would be
highly beneficial if an availability above 90 percent were desired.
Although repair actions appear favorable for availabilities-above
90 percent, it is difficult to draw any conclusions in this area.	 The S-056,
as pointed outpreviously, should not be expected to operate in this range.
If required, the basic design would probably change dramatically and an 	 j
C entirely new analysis would have to be performed. 	 Even _so, the option for
repair, particularly on mechanical systems with little reliability experience,
can be a valuable asset, especially if the inherent reliability is relatively 	 r
r
low.
In summary, it is important to note the general character of the two
curves° involved. 	 After the initial weight penalty, the repair curve is rela-
tively flat, independent of the assumed initial -system reliability.	 This is to
be expected and emphasizes that although the initial level may vary, the slope
{ of the curve is not sensitive to the component reliability estimates, provided
commonality of spares can be achieved. 	 However, the redundancy curve its
very sensitive to the component reliability estimates and therefore reduces
the confidence in this approach to achieve the desired availability.
r r
f	 t
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iIt should also be recognized that all components have not been
incorporated into this analysis.
	 The data employed is felt to be represen-
tative, but items such as the X-ray Event Analyzer Aluminum and Beryllium
proportional counters, have definite wear out characteristics as a function
of their exposure.	 The exposure time is not predictable, and consequently
could not be included in the analysis, but experience indicates that several
spares should be provided because they have a high relative likelihood of
failure occurrences. 	 In this case, adding multiple redundant components
could produce a severe design penalty. 	 The redundant component must be
' shielded until required and then calibrated against the counter to be
replaced.	 Also, a mechanism would be required to align the component with 1
the aperture opening.	 Redundancy for the aperture drive motors would pro-
duce even more complexity.
	 Consequently, although, the curves of Figures
7-12, and 7- 13 are only approximate, it is the considered judgment that
	
i
they are representative of what can be expected for the S-056 and similar
scientific instruments.
As discussed previously in Section 4 (Table 4-5, p. 4-26), the
w weight penalty associated with the remaining ATM instruments is consider-
4
ably higher than for the S-056, from 7 to 37 percent.
	 These values would
have a substantial impact on the weight increments needed to achieve the
	 9
desired availability.	 However, the weights are considered to be highly -con-
servative and are primarily related to the existing packaging concept of
components on the instruments.
	 The addition of redundant components would
also be expected to generate a severe weight penalty because of the unique-
ness of each design.	 Grating mirror torque motors could be replaced but
could not easily be made redundant.
	 Vidicons could be replaced but again,
redundancy would be highly questionable.:
	Hence, the items that could be
made redundant tend to be limited to the avionics, which inherently are very'
{ reliable anyway.	 Consequently, it is felt that the conclusions drawn for the
M S-056 are also _applicable to the remaining ATM experiments because they all
° fall within a class of scientific instruments developed for specific tasks
	 and	 All
therefore, unique in design and application of sensors.
b
x
tj
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8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The arguments for the use of mar_ are both subjective and objective.
The crew, without question, contributed significantly to the success of the
Skylab ATM experiments. Even under unexpected, improvised conditions,
it was sill possible to be effective. Had it been otherwise, the scientific
achievements would have been severely hampered. Contemplating these
achievements leads to the consideration of what might have been achieved
had the experiments been designed for repair action. It also leads to con-
sideration of what additional failures might have arisen that would have rein-
forced the need for direct manned intervention. It is a difficult question to
answer because of so many uncertainties. This Study has attempted to
rationalize and quantify some of the uncertainties to the extent that man's
contribution could be assessed versus alternative concepts.
In summary, s.t should be remembered that instruments of the type
flown on the ATM are relatively complex, unique in their application, and
often employ new sensor techniques. Consequently, if the system performs
well, as did many of the Skylab experiments, it should be recognized that this
is not necessarily the basic nature of this equipment. In general, the equip
ment should be expected to be less reliable than operational satellites em-
ploying sensors with a relatively long history of development. This unreli-
ability is often difficult to assess, emphasizing the need to retain all possi-
ble options to maintain an operational system. Thorough ground testing is
extremely important, but history has shown that even this may fail to expose
all weak points of a given design. Hence, the interest concentrates in quan-
tifying the benefits of repair and examining the basic character of scientific
i
equipment to develop guidelines for future developments. The fundamental
question remains of how to achieve the highest return of scientific data at
i
the lowest possible cost.
a
	
	
The Skylab experience demonstrated that, even with careful design
and extensive ground testing, active manned support greatly enhanced the
I	 -	 Yx
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scientific achievements of the ATM experiments. If the extent of astronaut
capabilities had been fully anticipated in design and mission planning, a sig-
nificantly further enhancement would have been realized through repair and
experiment management operations.
Going beyond this is speculation; however, the results of this effort
show that using a rational approach to redesign, with reasonable reliability
estimates, orbital maintenance is probably the most realistic means of
achieving a high !,.!stem availability. A capability to maintain approximately
f	 40 percent of the more significant subassemblies is estimated to be a lower:
bound. A more desirable figure of 60 to 70 percent maintainability is pre-
ferred to assure an availability in the 70 to 90 percent region. The results
of this Study indicate that these levels of maintenance can be attained with a
minimal impact on the instrument design. As an example, the S-056 X-ray
telescope would experience a weight growth of less than 7 percent. The
remaining instruments are estimated to show a higher penalty but the anal-
ysis was not as extensive as with the S-056 and it appears reasonable to
i expect a weight growth of no more than 15 percent.
There are two ways that manned maintenance can be implemented.
If the total system of experiments is sufficiently large, the crew can reside
3
within the observatory, _providing support to a broad set of applications. 	 3
This provides continual coverage and would inherently provide the highest
level of availability. Crew or scientist rotation could occur on a three-
month cycle at which time replenishment of spares could be achieved. This
is oneconcept. The alternative is to provide routine maintenance of a free
f
flying observatory based upon telemetry data. Hard copy data could be
retrieved and all anomalies corrected. If a serious failure occurs, support
could be provided on any scheduled Shuttle flight with the capability for a
revisit to the observatory orbit. The availability in this instance would be
reduced over active support but even this allows a great deal of flexibility
in dealing with unpredictable problems associated with design
deficiencies.
,f
!
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A further alternative, aside from automated space servicing, is to
<	 increase the levels of redundancy to achieve the desired levels of availabil-
ity. Although feasible, the results of this effort indicate that for these types
of systems, redundancy is not as cost-effective as manned maintenance rela-
tive to the payload weight to orbit. The weight to orbit to achieve a similar
level of availability can be a factor of two to ten times higher for redundancy
versus- spares provisioning. Even with the payload margins afforded by the
Shuttle, these factors cannot be ignored. In addition, the sensitivity of the
weight growth for redundancy is such that the optimum design, relative to
improved reliability, falls far below the desired availability region. On the
other hand, the optimum point on the repair curve lies near the upper value
of the desired availability (90%).
These characteristics appear to be fundamental, relative to the
assessment of man's utility. This is not to say a high level of reliability is	 -
not required or that redundancy and manned maintenance are incompatible
As the complexity of experiments increase (with associated cost increases),
it is ever more important to adhere to rigid design and test procedures.
Where redundancy can be employed without a severe penalty, it should be.
Alternate work around paths `
 should also be employed. However, the inher-
ent character of scientific equipments will necessarily have non-redundant
electromechanical devices, 'tight alignment tolerances, and complex se-
quences of operations. There may also be problems generated by support
systems that require alteration of the basic configuration. This type, of
flexibility can only be achieved by direct manned participation
One final note deserves mention, even though it was not addressed
in the Study effort. On any launch to orbit, there is some probability that
the instrument will not function as desired. Historical data (Refs. 1.8-19)
indicate that approximately 60 percent of the spacecraft launched through 	 a ,
1972 had some type of _anomaly existing immediately after insertion. Approx-
imately 65 percent of these represent -a significant loss to the payload. This
C=
i
n
value drops to 40 percent when redundancy is employed but still represents
a substantial loss of capability and risk to mission objectives. If the pay-
load were associated with a manned observatory, it is reasonable to expect
that repair operations could correct a very large percentage of these anoma-
lies. Since spares would already be provided for subsequent operation on
orbit, there should be no additional weight impact. Consequently, manned
maintenance, in this role, could be expected to substantially reduce the num-
ber of Shuttle re -flights required to establish payloads in orbit. Even for
unmanned payloads, spares provisioning should not represent more than a
tO to 15 percent weight penalty provided man can be utilized to perform the
repair.
The following guidelines are therefore recommended for future pro-
grams to utilize the unique capabilities that man's presence offers to the suc-
cessful operation of any payload, and particularly to long-lived scientific
experiments.
a.	 Design
i.
	
	
Repair capability should be provided at the subassembly
level for at least 60 percent of items performing an
active function during instrument operations.
2. The fundamental repair mode should be to remove/
replce the subassembly, or remove to the pressur-
ized 
a 
compartment for repair and diagnosis.
3. Guide pins should be provided for all subassemblies
requiring critical alignments.
4. Electrical connectors should be grouped to minimize
disconnect actions and be compatible with pressure
suit operations. All connectors should be self -
aligning and polarized.
5. Accessibility should be provided without visual obstruc-
tions for pressure suit operation to remove and replace
subassemblies.
6. Reliability standards should not be compromised because
-nanned maintenance. Redundancyof the availability of i
should be employed wherever feasible up to the point that
the reliability tradeoff is favorable.
rj
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7. Commonalty of components should be employed to the
greatest extent possible to reduce the spares provision-
ing requirements.
8. Repair actions should be concentrated on mechanical
and electro -mechanical equipment where redundancy
is restricted.
9. Repair of electronic equipment should not be precluded
even if redundancy is provided, using plug-in modules
where possible.
10. Visibility should be provided to assure unobstructed
removal and replacement of components or modules.
Means should be provided for positive guidance of
modules during remove/replace actions,
i i. All subassemblies should have handle and tether pro-
visions and tethers should be attachable prior to re-
moval from the instrument.
12. One way, non-reversable,erection devises, such as
Electro -Explosive Devices (EEDs), should be elimi-
nated due to the lack of a repair compatibility if
failure occurs.
b.	 Operations	 j
i. Operational timelines should be flexible enough to
accommodate, on the average, one unscheduled re-
pair action each day.	 Skylab experience indicated
that one repair action every two days was required
-which impacted the normal work routines
2. Instruments and subassemblies should have positive
identification, expecially where commonality is em-
ployed, employing for example, color coding of
components
3. Instrument power should not be required to support
removal and replacement of items, such as, solenoid
actuated hold down latches, 'power actuated or re-
strained doors.'`
4. Adequate lighting should be provided to allow unre-
stricted maintenance.
5. Repair actions should be accomplished by simple crew
`motions when operating' EVA. 	 Disassembly of compo-
nents, or modules should be relegated to a pressurized,
shirtsleeve environment.
	
Requirements for recalibra-
tion of equipment should be minimized.
t
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i6. All remove/ replace operations should be compatible
with a one-man operation. Remove/replace timelines
should be :-minimized.
7. Instrument .operations should not preclude changes in
basic programming to allow management for targets
of opportunity.
8. Reprogrammable sequences of operation are preferred
rather than hardwired sequences.
9. The capability to do a failure search to isolate failures
to a replaceable unit should be provided.
10. Attachment devices should be clearly visible to pre-
clude removal of more than one subassembly at a time
or damage to non-removable components.
11. No special maintenance training should be required
other than familiarity with the instruments.
This Study has only touched on a small part of man's utility in space.
It hopes to join with other efforts to surface the benefits, limitations and pos-
sible hazards of such actions. Further work is needed, leading to test pro-
	
g	 g	 p	 p	 utility.rams. and flight	 o erations to rove this th	 There are bounds to man's
activity r maintenance, at least in the near term. It is unrealistic to ex-e fo
pect him to assemble complex, intricate components requiring special tool-'
ing and training. This will come eventually, but the present need is to main'.-
tairt the operational status of equipment to maximize its value and to preclude
having to repeat the experiment at a later time. This presents a new chal-
"	 lenge to the designer, but improved performance should be a sufficient incen-
tive to accept this challenge. The important point is to continue to keep the
objective-in'mind and direct efforts toward it
is
.rn
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:.IODS REQUIRED XIODS REQUIRED - BBRC EST. WTITEM FUNCTION FOR F IZ CRIT. IMPACT NOTESEMOVAL/REPLACEMEN REPAIR N, O. Kg
Optics Housing Provides closure for Replace attachment screws None.
	 Cover hinged for --- 3.6
Cover and TCS housing.	 Active TCS pan- vith latch mechanism and access to components.
Panels els maintain constant inge.
temperature
TV Camera Provides visual image to Replace attachment' screws Not repairable. --- 4.5
astronaut monitor. with latch.	 Redesign elec-
trical disconnect.	 Add
alignment pins.
Film Camera Provides photographic bone; camera already No repair should be 606 0 ReplacementAssy. record of coronal image, designed to be removable. attempted on camera due cameras
calibration pattern and to danger of exposing film. provided.
other data.
TV Monitor Rotates TV image mirror Replace electrical discon- Add electrical disconnect 66< 2.7 Redundant moto rMirror Motor into optic axis. nect for EVA.
	 Add align- between motor and mechan provided..
ment pins..	 Replace attach ism assy.
screws with latch.	 Re-'
design cievis pin attachmen
with latch pin design for
EVA removal.
Polaroid Wheel Rotates 3 Polaroid filters Replace 4 base attach Add electrical disconnect 66 1.8
Motor- to provide polarization screws with latch.
	 Replace for wiring between motor
data of corona. electrical disconnect for and mechanism'assy.
EVA.
Internal Occult- Drives occulting disk. Same as above.
	 Also, add Same as above. 326- Assy has 2ing Disk Motor alignment pins to assy'base motors.
	 Fail-
ure restricts
• 1.8 disk motion.
LInternal Occult Provides internal optical 114
g Disk alignment capability to
Mechan i sm Y
_	
_
1
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MODS REQUIRED MODS REQUIRED BBRC ST. WT
ITEM FUNCTION FOR FOR GRIT. IIPACT NOTES
E\iO^T4L/REYL:ICEMEN REPAIR NO. Kg
Main Electron- Provides closure-for -c -ase -Replace attachment screws —None.,.._-Cover--hinged for__._ ---_ 4.5
ics Box Cover electronics. with latch mechanism and access.
hinge.
Power Supply Provides regulated power Replace base attachment Not repairable.	 See notes 2747 2.7 Welded module
to the instrument. screw with latch Tnechanisrr construction.
Replace electrical discon- Replace box.
nect for EVA.
. J-Box Serves as distribution Same as above. Same as above. --- 2.7 Redundant
point for power. standby box.
TCS Filter Box Signal bias for thermal Same as above. Same as above. --- 2.7
control.
DC/DC Supplies power to thermal Same as above. Same as above. --- 2.7 Redundant
Converter controllers, temp. standby convert
monitor, etc.
Motor Drive Provides matrix drive Same as above. Same as above. --- 2.7
Box logic.
Camera "Automatic sequencing and Same as above. Same as above. 986 Redundant pro-
Programmer timing function for camer p. grammer &
diode matrix in
2.7 swine box.
Camera Diode Encodes film exposure Same as above. Same as above. 455
Matrix data.
Pointing Error Provides error signal Same as above. Same as above. 338 Error electron-
Electronics discriminator for experi- ics digitizer in
n _ ,: r? -'equipment. 2.7 same box.
Pointing Error Digitizes error signal. Same as above. Same as above. 116
Digitizer
HODS REQUIRED MODS REQUIRED BBRC EST. WT
ITEM FUNCTION FOR FOR CRIT. IMPACT
i
NOTES
E\1O%, AL/REPLACE1%LEN REPAIR NO. Kg
Top Cover and Provides closure for case. Cover hinged with shear None.	 Cover and TCS --- 11.3 Remove coves
Thermal Control Active TCS maintains con-- tie and latch system. panels are not to be com- for access.
System stant temperature. Heater panel wiring pletely removed or
rerouted. repaired.
Primary Mirror Reflects entrant radiation Recommend no modifica- Recommend redesign. 1459 --- Torque motors
to spectrometer entrance tions.	 Extensive redesign Removal/ replacement of are integral par
slit.	 Pivots to provide required. torque motors of present of mirror asst'.
raster or line scan. design too difficult.
Difraction Grat- Difracts the light from Redesign to relocate Replace motor, gear box --- 6.8 Replacement of
ing (Motor Drive entrance slit to seven stepper motor, gear box and cam as a unit. 	 Rede- motor is
detectors.	 Motor positions and cam to allow removal sign of grating drive desirable.
grating upon command. without disturbing grating. required.
Detector Mount Seven detectors measure Replace bolts ;A Spectrome- Add electrical disconnects --- 6.8
Assy the intensity of light ter I/F with a latch/guide to each detector to allow
difracted by the grating. pin system.	 Add electrical replacement.
disconnects.
Data Handling Counts and conditions ' Replace hold down screws Entire box must be 3145 2.7 Assumes welded
Electronic Assy pulses from detectors for with latch system.	 Replace replaced.	 If repair is module con-
presentation to telemetry. electrical connector with a required, box must be struction.
quick disconnect. redesigned to P. C. boards
Raster Control Programs primary mirror Same as above. Same as above. 2240 2.7
Electronics for various operating mode
and stowed position.
Logic Interface Provides motor pulses for Same as .above. Same as above. 1069 2.7
and Motor Pulse different modes of operatio
Counter E'lec - Supplies grating position
tronics information.
Hugh Voltage "- Supplies voltage to the ame as above. Same as above. 687 2.7
Power Supply detectors.
i
__ MODS_ EQUIRED__.___- __-:_.`,IODS REQUIRED BBRC EST. WT
ITEM FUNCTION FOR FOR CRIT. IMPACT NOTES
REMOVALIREPLACENIENl REPAIR NO. Kg
Low Voltage Supplies power for Replace hold down screws Entire box must be 578 2.7 Assumes welded
Power Supply electronics operation, with latch system. 'Replace replaced.	 If repair is module
electrical connector with required, box must be construction
quick disconnect.._ redesigned to use P. C.
boards.
Power J-Box Serves as distribution Same as above. Same as above. 351 2.7-
point for Power,'' Command
signals and S/C interface.
Data Handling Presents data to control Same as above. Same as above. 315 2.7
Intensity Display panel for monitor and
positioning of selected
line of spectrum.
Controller Regulates temperature of Same as above. Same as above. 303 2.7
heater panels.
Estimated 'Weight Increase -' 46. 5
CANDIDATE ITEMS FOR REMOVAL/ REPLACEMENT
INSTRUIdENT: S082A XUV CORONAL SPEC TROHELIOGRAPH	 Page I of 1
MODS REQUIRED MODS REQUIRED BBRC ST. WT
ITEM FU\CTIONT FOR FOR CRIT. NIPACT NOTES
EMOVAL/REPLACEMEN' REPAIR NO. Kg
Aperture Door Prevents entry of light and Replace 4 screws with latch Add electrical disconnect 469 2.7
contaminant particles` to mechanism.	 Add electrical to leads for motor
optical system when not in disconnect EVA. replacement.
use.
Grating Assembl Allows selection of one of Cam assembly/ stepper Add electrical disconnects 2.6 4.5 Grating assy is
and Cam two wave lengths to be motor to be removed. to motor leads. separate from
Assembly directed to camera. 	 Cam Replace hold down with cam assy.
assembly positions the alignment pins and latching
grating. system..	 Replace' electrical
connector.
Short Wave' Rejects zero order white Replace hold down with Add electrical disconnects 229 4.5
Length Rejection light from the grating when alignment pins and latching to motor leads.
Mirror grating is in the short wave system.	 Replace electrical
length position.'' connector.
Instrument Provides power for door, Replace hold down with - No repair possible with From 2.7 Criticality
Electronics' camera, grating, etc. latching system.	 Replace construction employed. 3596 - varies with
five connectors with ones 207 components.
capable of being removed See
during EVA_ Notes
TCS Electronics Controls' heater panels Same as above. Same as above. -•- 2.7
Film Camera Provides photographic None; the camera is already No repair should be 5.3 0
Assembly record of XUV and time designed to be removable. attempted on the camera.
record. See notes of S082B.
Top Cover, and Provides closure for case. Cover (approx. 9 ft x 2 ft) None.	 Cover and TCS --- 11.3 Remove cover
Thermal' Control Active TCS maintains con- hold down bolts (=70) panels are not to be for access to
System- stant temperature within replaced by hinge, shear removed completely or components
case. tie and latch system.	 Heate repaired.
panel wiring rerouted to
hinged side.
r ^
MODS REQUIRED MODS REQUIRED BBRC EST. WT
ITEM FUNCTION - FOR FOR GRIT. [MPACT NOTES
RE\IO%_AL/REPLACE1vIEN REPAIR NO. Kg
Spectograph Prevents entry of light and Replace hold downs with Add electrical disconnects 7 2.7
Aperture Door contamination when instru- latch mechanism.	 Replace in motor leads for replace
ment not in use. electrical connector. ment of motor.
Primary 14irror Moves mirror t 35 arc secsRemoval of top cover and Redesign so rotor/stator 0.4 Suggest no
Torque Motor about center. TCS panels reqd.	 Entire can be removed as a unit. redesign.
mirror assy must be Present rotor can not be
removed.	 Add electrical removed.
disconnects and alignment
pins.
Predisperser Rotates drum which holds Removal of top cover and Add electrical disconnects 47 4.5
Drive Motor long and short wave length TCS panels regd.	 Entire to motor wires.
gratings through 180 0 . Predisperser Assy should
be removed.	 Precision
alignment pins regd.
Film Camera Provides photographic None; camera is already No repair should be 606 0
Assembly record of XUV with time removable. attempted on the camera.
record.
Pointing Refer- Optical system and elec-	 . Remova I of top cover and No repair to be attem pted. 4083 2.7
ence System tronics to provide control oJTCS panels reqd.	 Replace Replace Image Disector (IDT &
instrument painting.	 Pre- electrical connectors with Tube and electronics Video
sents TV image to crew. disconnects for EVA. module as single unit. Pream
Replace hold down bolts witf
guide. pins for alignment.
MODS REQUIRED MODS. REQUIRED BBRC _ ST. WT, _
IT EM FUNCTION FOR FOR GRIT. NIPACT NOTES
EMOVAL/REPLaCEME-N REPAIR NO. Kg
Top Cover and Cover provides structural Cover (approximately-9 ft None.	 Cover and TCS- ----- 11.3 Removal -
Thermal Control closure for case.	 Active x 2 ft) hold down bolts ( ^ 67 panels are not to be required to gain
System TCS maintains constant should be replaced, by a removed completely or access.
temperature within case. inge and latch system.	 All repaired.
irin.g rerouted.
High Voltage Generale _Replace hold down screws No repair possible with 1673 2.7 Fabrication of
Power Supply The electronics control with latch system.	 Replace welded module constructior all elect, boxes
the application of power, electrical connector with employed.	 Entire box identical.
the operation of doors, etcquick disconnect. replaced.
Analog Commuta See above. Same as above._ Same as above. 862 2.7
for and Exposure
Time Computer
Electronics''
Low Voltage See above. Same as above. Same as above. 3461 2.7 (L. V. P. S. )
Power Supply. 599 (Digital Elect.)
Digital and Buf-" 476 (Buffer Elect.)
fer Electronics
Pointing Refer- See above. Same as above. Same as above. 2.7
ence Subsystem
Electronics
Command Buffer See above, Same as above. Same as above. 864 2.7 (Command Buf-
and Digital T?d 6 fer & Digital TM
Programmer 1314 (Prog. Logic)
Logic Elect.
Data Stores and See above. Same as above., Same as above. 2.7
Diode Array
Command, Elect.
Filter Box See above. Same as above. Same as above. 2.7
(
s
MODS' REQU-IRE'D MODS REQUIRED ' BBRC -ST. W
ITEM FUNCTION FOR FOR CRIT. MPACT NOTES
EMOVAL/ REP LACEMEN REPAIR NO. Kg
Telemetry Com- See preceding page See precedingpage See preceding page --- 2.7
utator Electron-
.	 is S
Junction Box General: Replace hold down screws No repair possible with --- 2.7
Assembly The electronics control and standoffs with latch welded module construc-
the application of power, system,
	
Replace connectox tion employed.	 Entire
the operation of doors, with a Buick disconnect. box must be replaced.
etc.
Thermal Control See above. Same as above. Same as above. - 2.7
Subsystem
Power Supply
XUV Monitor ` Prevents entry of light and Replace screws holding the :odd electrical disconnects 7 Z. 7
Aperture Door contamination when not in assembly to the case with to motor leads.
use. a quick release latch
mechanism.	 Replace
electrical connector.
SEC Vidicon Provides a real time image Replace 6 mounting screws None. --- 4.5
Tube of the solar disk in then with latch assembly and
XUV ba%d between 170A guide pins for alignment.
and 550A. Provide electrical discon-
nect.
Camera Control Provides power, control 	 ' Provide latching system None. --- 2.7
Unit and telemetry to/from the : and electrical disconnect.
video camera.
XUV Monitor Provides commands for Provide latching system Same as other elect. 131 2.7
Door Command -door open and close. and electrical disconnect. boxes.
Elect.
XUV Monitor - Closes off side of case. -' Replace hold down screws None: --- 9.00
Case with quick release latchsys

Sub-Assembly , Component Failure Modes RLOO*
Single
Point--
Failure
-Repair
Poss
Repair Action
ELESCOPE Mirror I Misalignment of < 1 Yes No Alternate activity schedule to
SSEMBLY ss.embly - stop plate relative reduce heating - otherwise termin-
Front to mirror ate mission
Aperture - Due to thermal
Stop Plate distortion
- Mirrors &
- Failure of thermal
- Mirror standoff
Cell 0 Mirror Failure
- Temp rise above
900F due toloss
of thermal
protection
Forward Thermal distortion in <-I Yes No lternate activity schedule. 	 Some
Tube excess- of 7es c legradation can be tolerated;
otherwise terminate mission.
Aft Tube • Thermal distortion ( I Yes No Same as forward tube
Mounting $ Structural < I Yes No Terminate Mission
Plate Failure (titanium)
Insulator 0 Thermal leak path < 1 Yes No Alternate activity schedule; other-
Plate mise terminate mission
Optical Cube • Non- functional < l N/A No No impact
Assembly (for initial alignment
only)
.Sub-Assembly Component Failure Modes RLOO-'-
Single
Point
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
TELESCOPE Thermal Failure of standoff < i No Yes Alternate schedule of activities
ASSEMBLY Shroud, springs with proper access insulation(Cont.) Failure of mylar can be repaired/ replaced by
retainer - results manned action (clamps or tape)
in lass of insulation
Solar Shield • Thermal distortion < I Yes No Alternate activity schedule; other-
due to failure of vise terminate mission
i thermal standoffs(results in loss of
resolution)
Thermal # Thermal shorts due <.I Yes No inur distortion of focal plane can
Isolation to epoxy fracture e accepted - alternate activities;
Mount Dtherwise, terminate mission
Center • Loss of thermal < I Yes No Same as above
Mount isolation causing
misalignment with
ATM spar
Thermal 0 Thermistors 3 No Yes 11 active elements are redundant;
Control' • Thermostats owever, parts remove/replace
Assembly • Strip Heaters ould be performed
@R.esistors treat as RLOO of I because of
z
redundancy)
I Sub-Assembly Component Failure Modes RLOO*
Single
Point
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
CAMERA Film • Drive fails to 6 Yes Yes Crew remove and replace film
ASSEMBLY Magazine engage magazine assembly.	 If repeated
• Film take-up fails action fails to remove magazine,
due to high load terminate mission
1 Film becomes brittl
• Idler sprocket drag
• Latching pawl fails
to engage
• Latching pawl fails
to disengage
Filter • Loss of filter 5 Yes Yes Stepper motor and filter wheel are
Wheel material replaceable by manned action -
0 Step motor fails off manual adjustment of guides possi-
Step motor steps ble with proper tool
improperly
Filter wheel jams
Rotary • Motor fails off 5 Yes Yes Remove and replace shutter wheel
Disc ` i Motor steps impro- or motor or shim to reduce shutter
Shutter perly guide friction
1 Shutter guide frictio
Film Drive • Motor fails off 6 Yes Yes Remove/replace motor
Assembly • Motor steps
improperly
0 Motor stalls
Clutch fails to e Condl Drive linkage in camera housing is
fI properly adjustable = film magazine is not.
L	 I __ --Replace film magazine
x,
Sub-Assembly Component. Failure Modes RLOO*
Single
Point
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
CAMERA Data Block • Multiple failure of 9 Yes Yes Remoire and replace entire data
ASSEMBLY incandescent lamps block
(C'ont.) (44 req)
Film Magazine • Interference with 2 Yes Yes Reset guides with alignment tool or
Guide film magazine remove and replace guides (after
removing interface plate)
Airlock • Drive motor stalls or 4 Yes Yes Remove/replace motor - free
System fails off linkage.	 Manually open if neces-
• Linkage wears pre- sary.	 Replace seal
venting seal
• Linkage freezes
*Drive motor impro-
per response to step
command
• Damaged 0-ring' seal
CAMERA Exposure 0 Irratic time 4 No Yes emove/replace P. C. boards in
ELECTRONIC Timer sequences electronics package. 	 Verify
Control • Timer fails off/ on able/connector continuity. Oper-
• No output ate manually
O Fails to read inputs
thereby locking 'up
sequence
Sub-Assembly Component Failure Modes RLOO*
lFailure
Single
Point Repair
Poss
Repair Action
CAMERA Timers (12) $No output-fails to 4 No Yes Remove/replace P.C.-boards in
ELECTRONIC expose film electronics package.
	
Verify(Cont.) $Extended duration cable/connector continuity.
over exposes film Note: 'Manual override provided
Urratic outputs dis- for auto sequences and exposure
rupts delays betweer times can be manually controlled
exposures (RLOO is low because of backup;$Automated sequence: otherwise, would be higher)
unuseable (Low RLOO due to backupFs)
Filter *Fails to issue 3 No Yes Remove/replace P. C. boards.
Sequencer shutter open and/or Verify cable/connector continuity.(Motor drive
-
close commands Note: Crew or ground command
amp.) !'Fails to issue filter inputs to filter position.
position command
• Fails to issue ready
signal for next
command
Filter/ • Fails to read filter/ 5 Yes Yes Remove/ replace P. C.- boards.
Shutter Moto] shutter position Verify cable /connector continuity
Control Logi( signals
• Fails to issue drive
signal
0 Fails to issueTM
position info.
*Fails to issue signal
for film advance
i Sub-Assembly
I
Component Failure Modes RLOO *
Single_
Point `
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
CAMERA Film/Airlock $ Fails to advance 5 Yes Yes Remove/replace P. C. boards for
LECTRONIC Motor Contro film logic control.	 Verify cable/
(Cont.) Logic • Fails to open/close connect continuity.
airlock
•Fails to issue frame
count
•Fails to issue TM
` position info.
• Fails to verify film Magnetic Reed switch failure within
advance position film magazine can be corrected by
• Irratic film advance changing magazine only - Failure
action - 1/2 or multi on interface plate side is non-
ple frames repairable as currently designed
Motor Contro • Fails to issue one- 4 (4)* Yes Yes Remove/replace P. C. board
One-shot shot pulse
Amplifier 0 Issues improper
pulse
- Low voltage
-Wrong width
Data Block • Fails to read ATM 3 Ves Yes Remove/replace P. C.board
Electronics clock
• Fails to read shutter
position
• Flip-flops fail to
reset
Sub-Assembly Component Failure Modes RLOO*
Single
Point
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
CAMERA Active Mode • Fails to select 4 No Yes Remove/replace P. C. boards.
LECTRONIC" Logic/ proper timers- Override commands are available
(Contd.) Sequencer4 • Fails to generate in many cases providing substan-
sequence commands tial backup
- Timers
- Filter Position
Shutter Times
0 Fails to .issue
camera ready signal
Override f Fails to initiate 6 No Yes Remove/replace P. C. boards.
Logic electronic circuits Operate in auto mode only
• Fails to initiate start
signal
• Fails to issue stop
signal
Indicator • Fails to provide 5 Yes_ Yes Remove/ replace P.C. boards
Drivers signals to control Partial backup provided with TM
console
Operate
- Ready
-Filter Pos.
- Frames
Transient • Fails to protect low 3 Yes Yes Remove /replace P. C. boards with
Filter voltage power supply filter assembly
Sub-Assembly Component Failure Modes RLOOT
Single
Point
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
CAMERA Riwer • Fails with no output 6(7) Yes Yes Remove/replace P. C. boards
LECTRONIC Supplies • Fails with output Multiple single point failures.
(Contd.) +3 Volt out-of-spec Each power supply represents
+5 Volt @Fails with excessive a single point failure.
+6 Volt voltage
+7 Volt • Fails with ripple
+ 19 Volt
+ 20 Volt.
- 5 Volt I
-RAY EVENI Proportional #Failure of- output 10(2) Yes Yes Remove/replace - recalibrate
ANALYZER Counters • Saturation of-pulse Two counters involved
Al count with bias shift
Be
Aperture • Fails to read inputs :, 7(2) Yes Yes Manual override available.
Control Fails to issue Encoders can be removed and
- Encoder output pulses replaced if necessary
- Function •Fails to inhibit
Controller aperture position
- Puls e
Generator
Aperture • Capacitor Failure 5(2) Yes Yes Remove/replace P. C. boards
Motor Drive (no pulse output) One aperture motor for each
and Motors • Low pulse output proportional counter.
• Failure of step
motor
Sub-Assembly Component Failure Modes RLOO*
Single
Point
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
-RAY EVEN Amplifier $ Output failure " 2 (2) Yes Yes Remove/replace P. C. boards, etc.
ANALYZER -Loss of Capacitor
(Contd.) - Loss of Waveform
-
Loss of Gain
Preamp
H. V. Resistor
Calibrator • Failure to issue part 5 Yes Yes Remove/ replace P. C. boards
Be or all calibration
Al pulses for either
channel
• Imp-roper pulse
height fo;r calibration
Differential •Fails output 5 (2) Yes Yes Remove/replace P.C. boards.
Pulse Height -Amplifier fails
Analyzer - Failure to reset .
(DHA) flip-flops;
Voltage -Bias voltage shift
Comparitor
-'One-shot
Multivibra-
tors
- Flip-Flops
Sub-Assembly Component Failure Modes RLOO'm
Single
Point
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
-RAY EVEN Digital Signal *Fails to read out 8 (2) Yes Yes Remove/replace
ANALYZER Conditioner registers
(Contd.) 10-14 Bit	 _ : 0 Fails to issue aper-
Counters ture position isignal
• Loss of TM output
register
• Intermittent loss of
bits
Ratemeter & • Failure of output 5 Yes Yes Remove/replace circuit
Activity ! Saturation of output
History • Failure of input to
Plotter plotter
- Ops Amps
- Voltage Compare
FET gate
High Voltage • Fails output 7 (2) Yes Yes emove/replace either or both
Power • Fails feedback power supplies
Supplies 0Excessive noise
Al $ Excessive drift
Be
R
Sub- Assembly Component Failure Modes RLOO*
Single
Point
Failure
Repair
Poss
Repair Action
X-RAY EVENT Low Voltage • Fails to no output 6(4) Yes Remove/replace -multiple single
ANALYZER Power •Output out of spec point failures
(Cont.) Supplies (Excessive voltage
(4 Modules) IExcessive ripple
+ 5 volt
+ 12 volts
- 6 volt
f 12 volt
+ 28 volt
+ 29 volt
